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EAST TIMOR

20 years of occupation 20 years of resistance

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PEACE IS POSSIBLE IN EAST TIMOR
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Publisher: A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste
Design: Carlos Guerreiro
Translated by: Joan Oliveira
Archive photographs: CDPM and A Paz é Possível em Timor-Leste
Layout/Printing: Neograf-Artes Gráficas, Lda.

EAST TIMOR

20 YEARS OF OCCUPATION

Indonesia's military leaders were so confident of their army's superiority, and certain of East Timor's defeat within a fortnight, that they did not stop to consider any alternative to sheer military force.

Their initial intention may have been to transform the Timorese into Indonesians, but when this proved more difficult than they had envisaged at the outset they saw only one way to achieve their objectives: to intensify the violence.

When they realised they could not make 'real Indonesians' out of the Timorese, they decided to substitute them with 'real' Indonesians. A similar solution, 'ethnic cleansing', would be practised years later in the former Yugoslavia, but in the case of Timor, there were no neighbouring countries into which the Timorese could be driven: they were simply eliminated.

The result was that over 200,000 Timorese (one third of the entire population) were killed between 1975 and 1981 alone. To complement this genocide, Indonesia implemented policies which forced birth control on the Timorese and encouraged mass migration of Indonesians to the territory.

20 YEARS OF RESISTANCE

Even more surprising than the Indonesian generals' destructive obstinacy has been the Timorese people's capacity for resistance. Colonised for centuries by a handful of Portuguese, why have the Timorese so spiritedly resisted their new Indonesian colonisers?

Is their determination born out of the excesses of the occupation itself? Or do cultural differences between Timorese and Indonesians run so deeply that they generate mutual rejection? Is their resistance the fruit of genuine awareness of individual and collective dignity that has been systematically held in contempt by the occupiers, or does it stem from the knowledge that all peoples have rights which are recognised by international law? Opinions on such questions vary and could fuel endless discussion.

There is one aspect, however, on which everyone now agrees: if the Indonesians have not managed to eradicate Timorese resistance in the past 20 years, they are not likely to be able do so now. Almost the entire population now espouses the resistance, in one of its many forms, and it is now clear that, eventually, it will win the day.

The Timorese have proved beyond doubt that they are a different people to the Indonesian people. According to the United Nations Charter, and numerous UN General Assembly Resolutions, it is the duty of the international community to provide this people with the opportunity to form its own Nation.

Peace is Possible in East Timor

1975 DECOLONISATION INTERRUPTED

«Independence is a right of all nations, and the people of East Timor is no exception»

(Adam Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister, June 1974)

«There are only two possible solutions: either union with Indonesia, or continuation of the Portuguese Administration»

(Adam Malik, Dec. 1974)

Following 25 April 1974, which ended the 40-year-old authoritarian and dictatorial regime in Portugal, the new democratic administration agreed to grant its colonies the right to self-determination, which for over a decade the UN had been calling for. East Timor was among Portugal's colonies at that time.

The two main Timorese political parties, Fretilin and UDT, were both in favour of independence: ***«We maintain that independence is the only possible way for our people to be free of exploitation and oppression in all its forms».*** *(Fretilin/UDT Joint Statement, Dili 18 March 1975).*

The third party, Apodeti, wanted East Timor to be integrated with Indonesia while maintaining its autonomy: ***«Integration with the Republic of Indonesia, with internal autonomy status, in accordance with current international law»*** *(Apodeti's Program).*

Indonesia soon realised that Apodeti would be unable to expand its sparse influence among the Timorese, and decided to concentrate on creating a rift between Fretilin and UDT. Using a radio transmitter in Kupang (West Timor) it sent out messages in Tetum (native language spoken in East Timor) that were designed to poison relations between the two coalition parties. The chief weapon used by Indonesia was the spectre of Communism, which also served to sound the alarm in the West, especially in the US (then embroiled in the Vietnam War).

Aware that Indonesia's position would have direct bearing on their own country's future, the leaders of the two main Timorese parties went to Jakarta. Fretilin's Jose Ramos Horta returned to Timor with a letter from Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik:
«Independence is a right of all nations, and the people of East Timor is no exception» *(17 June 1974).*
By the following December, however, Adam Malik had changed his mind: ***«There are only two possible solutions: either union with Indonesia, or continuation of Portuguese Administration. Independence is not a realistic idea»*** *(quoted in UN Document «Decolonisation», No.7, Dec. 1974).*

At a meeting held in London in March 1975, by which time Jakarta's hostility towards independence was apparent, Portugal made its position clear to the Indonesian delegation. A report written by the Timor Government summarises that position as follows:

1. Portugal is not in a position to impose a solution of any kind;
2. If agreement cannot be reached, Portugal will submit the problem to international jurisdiction;
3. The decolonisation plan for Timor is as follows:
    - Provisional all-party government;
    - Provisional government in office for 5 to 8 years, by which time political maturity and economic self-sufficiency should be reached;
4. (Portugal) Suggests that Indonesia improve its image in the eyes of the Timorese, and provide economic aid, in order to enhance the likelihood of the Timorese choosing in their favour.» *(Report published in Lisbon in 1981).*

The pressure brought to bear on Francisco Lopes da Cruz, UDT Vice-Chairman, when he met in Jakarta with key members of Indonesia's armed forces, was plain to see: ***«We are realists. If we want to be independent, we must follow Indonesia's political line. Otherwise, our independence will not last for more than a week or, at most, a month»*** *(6 Aug. 1975, quoted by M. Roger, New York Times).*

Five days later, on 11 August, UDT seized control of the Police armoury in Dili, and appealed to the Portuguese to arrest the Fretilin leadership. The Portuguese Administration wanted to avoid siding with either of the two

Timorese forces, but almost the entire colonial army (about 2,000 men) was comprised of Timorese soldiers, most of whom had aligned themselves with Fretilin. In less than a month, Fretilin had gained complete control of the situation.

The clash had been violent. According to observers from ACFOA (Australian Council for Overseas Aid), between 2,000 and 3,000 were killed *(Reuters, 28 Sept. 1975).* When several thousand Timorese fled across the border into West Timor, Indonesia used the fact to justify its military incursions into East Timor.

At dawn on 7 December, hundreds of Indonesian paratroops landed in the capital, Dili, while naval warships entered the port. Like many of the eye-witness accounts in this report, the following is the testimony of a Catholic priest (priests were among the few allowed to stay, move about the territory with relative freedom, and keep in touch with the outside world):

«From 7 December 1975 to February 1976, the 23 warships anchored in the port of Dili bombarded day and night the hills that surround the city. Helicopters (8 to 12) and aircraft (4) circled the whole territory. Numerous tanks and armoured vehicles were on the ground, and there must have been about 50,000 (I'm not sure) Indonesian troops.» *(Catholic Missionary's letter, Nov. 1977).*

It is worth remembering that East Timor covers just 19,000 sq. kms. (smaller than Wales), and had a population of less than 700,000. The Indonesian generals had promised it would take them just 2 weeks to dominate the territory but, by the end of that time, they had not even subjugated the city of Dili which, at the time, barely had a population of 12,000 — far less than the number of soldiers invading it.

Portugal immediately broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia, and denounced its violation of international law. The UN General Assembly and Security Council adopted resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Indonesia's forces.

The General Assembly ...

- **Deeply concerned at the critical situation resulting from the military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor, (...)**
- **Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to desist from further violation of the territorial integrity of Portuguese Timor and to withdraw without delay its armed forces from the Territory in order to enable the people of the Territory to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence, (...)**

(UN General Assembly, Resolution 3485, 12 Dec. 1975)

1976

4 OUT OF 5 TIMORESE FLEE TO THE MOUNTAINS

«Your paratroops dropped out of the sky like angels, but they behaved like devils»

(Monsignor Ribeiro, Bishop of Dili)

100,000 killed in under a year

(report by Indonesian priests)

Eye-witness accounts of the unmitigated brutality are numerous. On 7 December, people who were found near a church were forced inside:

«at 9 am the following morning (8 December), soldiers ordered these and other people to the quay, where 27 women — both Timorese and Chinese — had already been assembled. This witness says that a certain number of women had children with them and that they were all crying. The Indonesians took the children from their mothers and handed them over to the crowd. They were then shot, one a after another. The Indonesians ordered those present to count out loud the numbers of those killed as they fell.

At about 2 in the afternoon, 59 men (both Timorese and Chinese) were led off to the quay. One of them was 'X', whose widow, according to my source, now lives in Australia. These men were killed one by one. Once again, those present were made to do the counting. She estimates that there were about 500. The victims had to stand on the edge of the quay, so that the bodies would fall into the water when shot. The Indonesian soldiers would carry on shooting at the bodies in the water if they showed any sign of life (...) These witnesses told me they had heard that the executions had continued.» *(Testimonies collected by Jim Dunn, the last Australian Consul in East Timor, and Chairman of the Australian Parliamentary Human Rights Committee).*

After the invasion, the Portuguese Catholic Bishop of Dili at that time, Monsignor Ribeiro, who was not a Fretilin sympathiser, sent a message to the Indonesian authorities via a Timorese opponent of Fretilin:

«Your Indonesian troops, with their murders, violations and pillaging are a thousand times worse (than Fretilin). Your paratroops dropped out of the sky like angels, but they behaved like devils.» *(quoted by Geoffrey Hull, Australian Justice and Peace Commission).*

After being censured by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, Indonesia decided to make it appear as though the Timorese themselves asked for the integration of their territory with the Republic of Indonesia. On 31 May, an ostentatious session of the «People's Assembly of East Timor» was held. Even today, Jakarta points to that occasion as being the moment when the Timorese enacted self-determination. A law, drafted specifically for the purpose, stated that: ***«the members of the 'People's Assembly' are elected from among the residents of the administrative district concerned, in accordance with the principles of consensus and consent, and taking into account existing or emerging traditional and cultural values in said district»*** *(Annuaire des Pays de l'Océan Indien, p. 264).*

The law was open to wide interpretation, and actually prepared the ground for total absence of democratic choice, as «elected» could in practice mean «chosen by the armed forces». On the basis of this law, the occupiers appointed the 37 members of the «People's Assembly», who were to request East Timor's formal integration with Indonesia. It is worth remembering that, at that time, Indonesia's armed forces still only controlled a tiny part of East Timor (according to a report written by Indonesian priests visiting the territory three months later in September, the Indonesian army had managed to dominate just 150,000 inhabitants out of the total 650,000). Therefore, even if the members of the «Assembly» had been elected democratically, just the small minority under foreign military occupation would have been able to elect them.

The UN declined Indonesia's invitation to attend the ceremony. Only seven «friendly» nations sent representatives (Saudi Arabia, India, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, New Zealand and Thailand), and even then, India's delegate expressed doubts about the validity of the self-determination ceremony. Immediately after the act of «self-determination», the members of the «Assembly» unexpectedly disappeared, before the diplomats and journalists present had a chance to talk to them.

In September, nine months after the invasion, a delegation of Indonesian priests visited Dili. The report of their

findings gave an early suggestion of the extent of the genocide:

«The number of people in the towns and villages occupied by Indonesian troops is about 150,000, out of a total population of 650,000 inhabitants (...) They told us that so far about 60,000 Timorese had been killed. We had thought this was a very high figure as it meant 10% of the population had been killed. However, when we spoke of these numbers to two priests in Dili, they told us that, according to their calculations, the number of dead was about 100,000.» *(report of the Parliamentary Library/Legislative Research Service, Australia, 22 Nov. 1976).*

As the Indonesian priests reported, the great majority of East Timor's people demonstrated in their own way how they felt about the arrival of the Indonesians — they fled into the mountains.

The Security Council (...)

- **Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,**
- **Believing that all efforts should be made to create conditions that will enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination, (...)**
- **Calls upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor, as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV),**
- **Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without further delay all its forces from the territory.**

(Resolution 389, 22 April 1976)

1977 BOMBING AND ENCIRCLEMENT

«It is possible that 50,000 people have been killed (...) perhaps even 80,000. But what is all the fuss about?»

(Adam Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister)

«However great the oppression, they won't take away their ideal.»

(a Catholic priest)

On 30 March, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, told foreign press correspondents :
«It is possible that 50,000 people have been killed during the war in Timor, perhaps even 80,000. But what is all the fuss about? It was war. What is that number compared with the 600,000 who wanted union with Indonesia!» *(quoted by Geoffrey Hull, Australian Justice and Peace Commission, 1992).*

Indonesia's Foreign Minister was fully aware that, at that time, no more than 150,000 Timorese were under Indonesian domination, as they were the ones living in the cities which had been occupied by his country's army. He knew that this did not mean they wanted union with Indonesia. Approximately 500,000 Timorese had fled before Jakarta's advancing army, and were living in the mountainous countryside.

In September, the Indonesian army launched a large-scale operation in the border area (around Liquiça, Maliana, and Bobonaro). Its aim was to force the resistance to retreat into the interior. French journalist Denis Reichle, who had managed to enter the territory undetected, estimated the number of Indonesian soldiers involved in the operation to be 38,000 — equivalent to one-tenth of Indonesia's entire armed forces at that time. This information was later confirmed by the Australian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Group *(Report, 8 March 1979).*

According to testimonies referring to that period, Indonesia's armed forces wasted no time trying to reason with the Timorese: bombing was their main means of persuasion:
«Since September, the war has intensified. Air bombing goes on around the clock. Hundreds of people die every day. Birds of prey feed on the corpses of the unfortunate ones. (If we are not killed in the war, the plague will kill us). Villages totally destroyed. Boroughs decimated... Barbarity, cruelty, pillage — the indescribable devastation of Timor. There is total insecurity, and the terror of imprisonment is our daily bread. Fretilin soldiers who surrender are slaughtered — no detention for them. It won't be long before there is Genocide. All able-bodied young people are in the bush. The Indonesians control no more than a 1 or 2 km. radius around the cities.
The Bishop's new residence was burnt down by the barbarians. The seminary in Dare has been destroyed. The colleges in Maliana and Soibada have been destroyed. Timor has not been integrated, but annexed. It has not been liberated from Communism, but delivered into the hands of barbarians and sold to the Moslem Indonesians. Freedom of any kind is non-existent. The world ignores us, and it is a shame ... we are on the road to genocide» *(letter from a missionary, Nov. 1977).*

The following was written by another priest in a letter to an Australian solidarity group:
«In Timor, the intensity of the violence of our Indonesian 'friends' continues to increase, with all kinds of terrible consequences. The barbaric genocide of an innocent people carries on, while consciences are apparently completely untroubled. East Timor was the victim of an invasion, of brutal conquest which is leaving a trail of anonymous corpses, mutilated men and women, and orphaned children in its wake. Consciences are clear because of postulations that the population was Communist» *(quoted by Geoffrey Hull, Australian Justice and Peace Commission, 1992).*

On 13 December 1977, another Father wrote :
«Two years of terrible fighting created symbols and heroes, solidarity of blood and friendship. However great the oppression, they won't take away their ideal. On the contrary, oppression will only reinforce it and give it new motivation (...)
Their (the Indonesians') ***determination to reduce everything to zero is evident. Dom José*** (the Portuguese Catholic Bishop) ***said that they would exterminate all the able-bodied men and all Timorese youth (and he***



said it with such conviction, that he must have had good reason for doing so) and that only ashes would remain. The people, and this also worries Dom José, will come to be looked upon as primitive. If problems arise, they will be passed off as problems among primitive 'suku' and of no significance — just as they did, and continue to do, in Irian Jaya...» *(letter from a priest, 13 December 1977).*

Years later, testifying before the UN Decolonisation Committee, Moisés Amaral, a leader of UDT in Exile, was to state: ***«In 1975, my family consisted of 37 people, but in 1979 the number had been reduced to 9. In less than 3 years, I lost my parents, 7 of my brothers, 4 brothers and sisters in-law, and 15 nieces and nephews.***
My clan, composed of over 600 people, was reduced to less than 100 survivors» *(New York, 1987).*

The General Assembly (...)

- Deeply concerned at the continuing critical situation in the Territory, resulting from the persistent refusal on the part of the Government of Indonesia to comply with the provisions of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, (...)
- Reaffirms the inalienable right of the People of East Timor to self-determination and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve that right, (...)
- Calls upon the Government of Indonesia and the leadership of the Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente to facilitate the entry into East Timor of the International Committee of the Red Cross and other relief organisations in order to assist the people of the Territory, (...)

(UN General Assembly – Resolution 32/34, 28 Nov. 1977)

1978

ARMS FROM THE WEST USED ON THE TIMORESE

«In a single day, the Indonesians dropped between 600 and 700 bombs»

(Report from this Sad Captivity, July 1978 — June 1981)

Hundreds of villages were *«wiped off the face of the earth by the bombing»*

(an Indonesian official, quoted by Jim Dunn)

1978 saw the start of «Operation Skylight», a new large-scale military operation commanded by the Indonesian Defence Minister himself, General Yusuf. The operation's main aim was to «clean up» the region around Dili, and prepare for President Suharto's visit in July. Although a further division of 15,000 ground troops was sent into the area, Jakarta was to focus heavily on its air attack capability.

In 1978, Australia sold Indonesia 12 Bell Sioux helicopters and 12 Nomad aircraft, while British Aerospace agreed to sell Jakarta 8 Hawks equipped with air-to-ground missiles, and US vice-president Walter Mondale went to Jakarta to negotiate the sale of 16 A4 Sky Hawks, adapted for anti-insurgency missions.

Almost three years after the invasion, fairly large villages not far from Dili (such as Railaco, Remexio, and Lació), which were still holding out against the Indonesian army, were finally overcome when air strikes were used against them. It was the civilian population that suffered most of the casualties caused by the aerial bombing, which included the use of napalm bombs.

A prominent Indonesian official (who wished to remain anonymous), was quoted in a document of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Australian Parliament as saying that hundreds of villages had been ***«wiped off the face of the earth by the bombing» and many names of places had simply «disappeared from the map of Timor»*** *(Jim Dunn, People's Permanent Tribunal, 1983).*

A Portuguese missionary, Father Leoneto do Rego, was Director of the Soibada Mission, situated in the island's mountainous interior, and spent the first three years of Indonesian occupation with his parishioners in areas controlled by the resistance. When he eventually left Timor, he described his experiences:
«From 1978 onwards, the advance of the Indonesians was much greater. Short of weapons and ammunition (because nothing was ever received from outside), Fretilin was forced to start retreating. A huge encirclement operation, targeted on my zone, was set in motion: Indonesian troops disembarked on the South coast, while others converged on us from the North and East. Fretilin's defence lines began to give way and the exodus of villagers commenced. (...) At one point, we managed to break through the Indonesian lines. We made our way back to where we had crops, and gathered in the harvest. Two days later, the aircraft arrived.
(...) Everyone had to run to escape the successive Indonesian attacks. I was so weak that groups of people were passing me by, and I just could not keep up with them. (...) I came across a buffalo carcass with a piece of dry hide on it, covered in ants, and decided to cook it. With a few bits of bamboo I made a fire that smoked a lot. When the hide was cooked, and I was beginning to feel an appetite, a boy appeared. He was anxious about what I was doing, and told me to put the fire out because of the Indonesians. We put it out, and I went off with the boy to join his family. Lucky for me! In no time at all, two mortar shells exploded just about where I had been cooking the buffalo» *(65 years of age and infirm, Father Leoneto do Rego gave himself up to the Indonesians on 31 Dec. 1978).*

Another witness recounted the following:
«On 23 November 1978, up in the Uadaboro hills, which are part of the Matebia range in the eastern part of the island, 1,500 people including pregnant women and children of all ages, were mown down by machine guns. The massacre took place after the Indonesian troops had enticed and tricked the people by telling them they had only come to «help the people of Timor». The same thing happened in Taipo, where 300 people were killed the same way. In numerous other places, the same method was used, although there were less casualties.
All kinds of bombs, including napalm, are dropped during the air raids, which are non-stop and nearly always target the populated areas. On a single day, they dropped between 600 and 700 bombs near mount Matebian.



At present, 70 to 80 people die every day in each borough. The enemy seems intent on annihilating the entire Timorese race. Sometimes, these unfortunate people are allowed to go into the forest to look for tubers with which to ward off the pangs of hunger. When they return, they are accused of having been in touch with the guerrillas and are shot» *(Report from this Sad Captivity, 1981).*

On 31 December, an elite force of 2,500 commandos managed to surround and kill Nicolau Lobato, Fretilin's Chairman. The legend that had built up around this charismatic leader made the Indonesians think (and actually announce) that, with his death, the rebel forces would cease to exist.

The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Belgrade, echoed the Security Council's resolutions and called for the withdrawal of Indonesia's armed forces from East Timor.

Once again, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution and addressed an appeal to the Security Council, but these efforts were fruitless — Indonesia's powerful western allies blocked everything which displeased their ally.

The General Assembly (...)
- **Deeply concerned at the continuing critical situation in the Territory, resulting from the persistent refusal on the part of the Government of Indonesia to comply with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council, (...)**
- **Draws the attention of the Security Council, in conformity with Article 11, para. 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, to the critical situation in the Territory of East Timor and recommends that it take all effective steps for the implementation of its resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976) with a view to securing the full exercise by the people of East Timor of their right to self-determination and independence. (...)**

(UN General Assembly - Resolution 33/39, 13 Dec. 1978)

1979

FAMINE: INTERNATIONAL AID MISAPPROPRIATED

«Over 100,000 people in a state of utter starvation»

(a diplomat who visited several camps)

The situation was *«as bad as in Biafra, and potentially as grave as in Cambodia»*

(David Delaprez — International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC)

Late in 1978, diplomats, journalists and representatives from humanitarian organisations were invited to East Timor. What Indonesia had to show them earned East Timor a place on the list of the worst catastrophes ever caused by mankind. The Canadian Ambassador, who visited the Remexio camp, told journalists that:
«The inhabitants are in a deplorable state. In many cases, they are actually starving to death, desperately sick, in need of immediate help in terms of food, clothing and elementary medical assistance».
The diplomats taking part in the visit sounded the alarm:
«Over 100,000 people in a state of utter starvation».

Frank Carlin, head of US Catholic Relief Services, confided to Australian journalist Peter Rodgers that the famine problems in East Timor were «the worst» he had found in his 14 year experience in Asia. David Delaprez of the ICRC found the situation ***«as bad as in Biafra and potentially as grave as in Cambodia»*** *(Sidney Morning Herald, 1 Nov. 1978).*

In spite of appeals to the Indonesian Government, and reminders of the terms of the Geneva Convention, Indonesia had refused to allow the ICRC into East Timor after 7 December 1975. Only in 1979, as a result of appeals from the diplomats who had visited the territory, and pressure brought to bear by several governments (the US in particular), as well as material help provided by some of those governments, did Indonesia allow international aid and three ICRC delegates to enter East Timor, but conditions were imposed:
«All aid must pass through the central and regional governments, while the grants for humanitarian operations must be handed over to the Indonesian Red Cross which is in charge of this work» *(Mochtar, Indonesian Embassy Newsletter, June 1979).*

The ICRC complied with Indonesia's conditions. The activities and movement of the three Swiss ICRC delegates in East Timor were restricted, and they always had to obtain official approval before any inspection. They were allowed to visit 13 camps, holding a total of 75,000 people, 60,000 of whom were in an appalling state of malnutrition. The ICRC delegates said that 20,000 of them would very probably die.

UN Deputy Secretary of State Holbroocke estimated that the number of people living in such camps, under tight security, was as many as 200,000 *(USAID — US Agency for International Aid — Situation Report no.1, 19 Oct. 1979).*

The restrictions imposed by the Indonesian Government laid the international aid wide open to being directly and indirectly appropriated by the Indonesian armed forces. The absence of international officials meant that the Indonesian Red Cross had to be called upon to distribute the aid, and even the occupying army had to be resorted to for help with transportation, which was charged at exorbitant prices *(e.g. 850 US dollars per hour for helicopter hire — David Jenkins).*

In January, shortly after the arrival of an Australian ship loaded with international aid, the medical supplies which had been donated by New Zealand were found on sale in the Vong Vi Vung shops in Dili, while food aid also found its way onto the markets:
«Sacks of rice, marked 'For Free Distribution', were being sold for between 12,500 and 18,000 Rupees in Dili, for 25,000 in Laga, and for 30,000 in Baucau» *(CAFOD, 12 July 1979).*

The ICRC's activities were allowed to go on for 18 months, but in April 1981 the delegates' permits were not renewed



by the authorities, because Operation Keamanan (security) was in preparation. Timorese generally agree that, while the ICRC delegates were present in East Timor, there was a noticeable toning down of the violence. However, since they were usually in Dili, their presence did nothing to stop the massacres perpetrated in other parts of the territory.

Antonio Tavares, a Timorese nurse who is now a refugee living in Portugal, worked for Catholic Relief Services and for UNICEF. He has confirmed that aid channelled through UNICEF had to be turned over to Indonesians for administration. He took part in water distribution projects, the funding for which was entrusted to doctors. They were supposed to contact the authorities who, in turn, were to organise the locals to undertake the work and get paid for doing so. Instead, however, the authorities used to order people to do the work as 'Gottong Royong' ('voluntary work'), and the funds that were meant to pay the people for their labour ended up being shared between the authorities and the doctors. Tavares said that one day UNICEF protested because, six or seven times a year, the military would claim ridiculously high amounts for tyre changes.

> **The General Assembly (...)**
>
> - **Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),**
> - **Declares that the people of East Timor must be enabled freely to determine their own future, under the auspices of the United Nations,**
> - **Expresses its deepest concern at the suffering of the people of East Timor as a result of the situation now prevailing in the Territory,**
> - **Calls upon all parties concerned to facilitate the entry into the Territory of international relief aid in order to alleviate the suffering of the people of East Timor, (...)**
>
> *(UN General Assembly - Resolution 34/40, 21 Nov. 1979)*

1980 RESISTANCE TO THE GENOCIDE

«Over the past six years ... the number of victims has surpassed 200,000»

(collective document from members of religious orders in East Timor)

«With each wave of repression the struggle gathers momentum.»

(former Timorese prisoner)

Indonesian armed forces finally gained control over all towns and villages. Once they had achieved what they considered to be their main objective on the ground, Jakarta then turned its attentions to enhancing its image abroad. To counter the reports that East Timor had been the scene of genocide, Indonesia set about organising a census.

In 1974, Portugal had conducted a census which put the population of East Timor at 650,000. US journalist Rod Nordland of the *Philadelphia Enquirer* (who won the *Pulitzer* Prize for his work in Timor) pointed out that in 1974, although the Portuguese Government had asked all East Timorese to make their way to centres carrying out the census, some people who lived up in the mountains did not bother to go. For that very reason, the population was estimated to be 680,000.

In 1980, on the other hand, Indonesia was anxious to come up with a high figure, so it included Indonesian officials and traders who had arrived in Timor in the army's wake. According to Indonesian statistics, therefore, the number of inhabitants of East Timor in 1980 was 555,350 — the same number, they said, as there had been 6 years before. The tragic reality was, however, that the number given by Indonesia signified a drop of over 100,000 in relation to the 680,000 of 1974. Furthermore, an authoritative Indonesian source confided to Jim Dunn, Chairman of the Australian Parliamentary Human Rights Committee, that the 1980 census had really found that the population numbered less than 400,000 *(Jim Dunn's statement before the People's Permanent Tribunal, 1981).*

The Catholic Church of East Timor challenged the figures presented by Indonesia. Monsignor Costa Lopes, Apostolic Administrator of the diocese, instructed all the priests to carry their own census in their parishes. The results gave a total of 425,000 — a loss of 255,000 people in six years, and this figure did not even make allowances for the high birth rate among Timorese.

In 1981, while attending a meeting of Indonesian Catholic religious Superiors, the members of religious orders in East Timor presented a document which stated that:
«The tragedy that has struck the people of East Timor for the past six years has caused the loss of over 200,000 lives. We can only conclude that the Indonesian army, which liberated Indonesia from colonial rule in such an awe-inspiring way, will never liberate the East Timorese from colonisation and lead them to autonomy and national independence because the circumstances and reality in Timor are very different.
What has happened over the past five years is significant: invasion, war, pillage, annihilation of the indigenous population, territorial subjection, colonial exploitation, expulsion of the indigenous population and their substitution by people from other islands, military occupation, attempts at mass mobilisation of people between the ages of 12 and 55, with a view to triggering war between them.
What the people of East Timor want — and have wanted from the outset — is the right to choose their own future, and not the massacres brought upon them by their neighbours.» *(Collective Reflection of members of religious orders in East Timor, 31 July 1981).*

Even the genocide did not crush the Timorese. To the amazement of the occupiers, on 10 June, when the 'Day of Portugal' is celebrated, Dili's radio station and two military barracks were attacked by armed men. The attacks had been the work of Dili's own people, whom the Indonesian army had thought they had vanquished. The reaction of the occupying forces was violent. One Timorese, imprisoned at the 'Mes Korem' Military Command after these incidents, described life in detention:

«Several methods of torture are used on political prisoners: electric shocks; placing the prisoner's toes under the legs of the chairs on which they sit, until the toenails fall off; forcing prisoners to hold up heavy weights for hours on end in the blazing heat; whipping; punching the prisoner's stomach and chest until blood pours from the nose and mouth; burning the prisoner's face and genitals (of both women and men) with lighted cigarettes. At night, the women prisoners are subjected to their jailers' sexual perversion and, as a result, it is not uncommon for them to bear children while they are in prison. They snatch the crucifixes from around our necks and order us to trample on them and kick and punch us, forcing us to do so. After two and a half months of this hell, we were sent to the central Caicoli jail. There, every Tuesday night at 9 pm, they would take away groups of 5 to 10 prisoners (around one hundred of our companions in all), and we don't know whether they're alive or dead.

In spite of all this, there is growing determination to fight for national liberation, so we can build a better Timor for our children. With each wave of repression the struggle gathers momentum. It is a whole nation that is resisting.» *(Mes Korem, 28 Feb. 1985).*

The General Assembly (...)

- Deeply concerned at the continuing suffering of the people of East Timor as a result of the situation of hostilities still prevailing in the territory, (...)
- Welcomes the diplomatic initiative by the Portuguese Government as a first step towards the free exercise by the people of East Timor of their right to self-determination and independence, and urges all parties directly concerned to co-operate fully with a view to creating the necessary conditions for the prompt application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), (...)

(UN General Assembly - Resolution 35/27, 11 Nov. 1980)

1981

THE RESISTANCE GATHERS FRESH IMPETUS

«The people are forced to act has human shields for the Indonesian troops ... You can feel it everywhere — the resistance is gathering fresh impetus»

(a priest)

«I feel an urgent need to denounce ... the genocide so that, if we are to die, at least the world will know that we died standing up.»

(Monsignor Costa Lopes)

After confining almost the entire population into towns and controlled camps, the Indonesian army now wanted to dominate its spirit. Repression became more selective. They tried to eliminate all those who might harbour or spread the flame of resistance: the first to be targeted were all those with any degree of schooling, and those with relatives who had taken to the bush.

«The eradication of the (Timorese) intelligentsia is one of the invader's intentions. Practically all educated people have been eliminated, or are about to be.» *(letter from a priest, Jan. 1981).*

«In Uatolari, borough of Viqueque, all the boys who had got as far as the second year of primary school or further were exterminated.» *(Report of the resistance, July 1981).*

Relatives of those in the resistance were particularly singled out: four thousand people who had a family member in the bush were deported to Atauro Island, a small island off the coast north of Dili, where many died of starvation. In 1984 Indonesia repatriated most of the surviving deportees because Atauro Island had turned into a show-case for human rights violations, which had attracted the attentions of humanitarian organisations and several governments.

In an attempt to convince the Timorese that resistance was pointless, the military commander decided to carry out a large-scale military operation, in which all male Timorese aged between 12 and 55 years were to take part. They were forced to form huge human chains and then surround the areas in which there was guerrilla activity. The Indonesians wanted the Timorese not only to witness the annihilation of the resistance, but to actually take part in it as well.

Between 30,000 and 50,000 (depending on the source) men were made to form:

«several circles ahead of various battalions. The people were forced to act as shields for them ... lines of people in front of lines of Indonesian soldiers, in circle formation around the pockets of guerrilla resistance.

They formed several circles around Mount Santo Antonio. Many witnesses reported that, at one point, Fretilin guerrillas approached the people and told them that they wished to do them no harm and that they should go back, because it was the Indonesians they were after. Most said that Fretilin had powerful weapons and terrified the guys (Indonesians). But the people could not go back. The guys told the people: 'One way or another you are going to be killed — either by them or by us.' The Fretilin guerrillas then told the people: 'we are fighting for the people, not against the people.' And many guerrillas were killed when they could no longer fire their guns without hitting their own people. This episode seems to be one of the incidents which made most impression on the minds of all those who were there and are now coming back.»

«The people from the mountain and those of the resistance who did not manage to escape the encirclement were simply massacred in front of everyone, by being riddled with machine-gun fire or stabbed to death. Children of all ages were dismembered; pregnant women were cut open and their unborn babies crushed or cut to pieces. Witnesses report that even some Indonesian soldiers wept at the sight.»

«Lately, something extraordinary has been happening. It is really remarkable: in spite of the degrading deportations and the brutality of the recent massacres,

there has been no noticeable dwindling in the determination of the Timorese ... On the contrary, fresh vigour in both the strength and determination to resist and to fight for independence can be felt everywhere — listening to old and young lately, that is the conclusion one reaches.» *(diary of a missionary, Sept.-Oct. 1981).*

On 13 October, Monsignor Costa Lopes publicly condemned the Mount Santo António massacre:
«Today, 13 October 1981, before a crowd of between 12,000 and 15,000 people, I thought it right that I should denounce, for the first time, the death of 500 Timorese who were cruelly murdered just after they had surrendered.»
After the ceremony, the head of the diocese was summoned by the Military Commander and reprimanded for his outspokenness. Monsignor Costa Lopes replied:
«I feel an urgent need to denounce, as I did this afternoon, the genocide being carried out in Timor so that, if we are to die, at least the world knows that we died standing up.» *(written testimony of Monsignor Costa Lopes).*

The General Assembly (...)

- **Deeply concerned at the suffering of the people of East Timor and at reports of the critical situation resulting from the new outbreak of famine in the Territory, (...)**
- **Recalling the communiqué of the Council of Ministers of Portugal, issued on 12 September 1980, in which the Administering Power pledged to undertake broad initiatives with a view to ensuring the full and speedy decolonisation of East Timor, (...)**
- **Calls upon all interested parties, namely Portugal, as the Administering Power, and the representatives of the East Timorese people, as well as Indonesia, to co-operate fully with the UN with a view to guaranteeing the full exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of East Timor; (...)**

(UN General Assembly - Resolution 36/50, 24 November 1981)

1982

INTENSIVE SURVEILLANCE

«The resistance still exists, thanks to the inhabitants who help it.»

(Indonesian military documents)

«It is necessary to keep them under surveillance ..., follow ..., prohibit ..., check ...»

(idem)

Two Indonesian military documents were seized by guerrillas, and smuggled out of Timor. Amnesty International checked their authenticity. There could be no better proof of the entire Timorese population's resistance to the occupier.

These two booklets, containing recommendations for Indonesian military personnel posted to Timor, revealed what the military leadership thought about the GPK (Indonesian initials for 'Security De-stabilisation Movement', the name given to the Timorese resistance by the occupiers):
«The members of the GPK are sons of the people and represent the aspirations of the people (...) they possess a very militant fighting spirit and operate efficiently, with a spirit of self-sacrifice, and speed.»

With regards the Timorese recruited by the Indonesian army:
«They appear to be members of the Indonesian army but, deep down, they are still GPK sympathisers.»

This also applied to the civilian population:
«It is a fact that the GPK still exists thanks to the inhabitants who, in the pacified zones (meaning those controlled by the Indonesian army) ***provide it with logistic support, intelligence, and hideouts.»***

The military were to be vigilant and repress, and the documents gave detailed instructions on how to go about it:
«It is necessary to make lists of all the villagers, especially those who in the past have been Fretilin supporters;
Keep a close watch on the civil servants who, from time to time, make negative comments;
There is a need to follow people who are still in contact with the GPK, by using daily surveillance methods:
Make a complete list of the residents of each village, specifying each person's occupation;
Appoint one informer for every ten families;
Villagers must be forbidden to go out to the fields alone;
Find out from the people of each village exactly who is still out in the bush; take note of their names, age, where their wife, brothers, and children can be found...»

The surveillance methods were not enough and, inevitably, this led to more violent tactics — searches, detention of suspects, and torture:
«For the searches to be effective, the plan must be kept secret;
When the raid is underway, people must not be allowed to move, otherwise they are to be considered GPK members;
If the search is carried out at night, anyone leaving is to be considered an escaping GPK member».

If prisoners or suspects were ***«stubborn»*** while being interrogated, or if they gave ***«vague or unclear answers», «rigorous»*** or ***«brutal»*** methods could be used. In such cases, however, ***«no one should find out, so as to avoid the animosity of the population.» «Avoid photographs depicting torture.»*** *(Kodim 1628/06, Baukau, Timtim, Baurah).*

In December, a priest wrote:
«Arrests and disappearances are still occurring at the same rate. In the Ainaro, Same, and Alas zones, hundreds of people have been arrested, disappeared, and slaughtered (...)
Villages and schools are reduced to ashes, to the anguish of the missionaries who built them. Hundreds and hundreds of people are still arriving, manacled, to Atauro Island.
Macabre scenes are a Javanese speciality in East Timor: cutting-off heads and displaying them in public; the Commander goes along to give an air of solemnity to the act and has his photograph taken among the remains; bodies dragged by vehicles through the village streets, burning them in front of the people in the market square; simply burning people alive, as they did recently in Ainaro. On 11 November, in Manatuto, at three in the afternoon, Indonesian commandos showed the people 3 or 4 severed heads. A soldier held up one of the heads by its hair. It seemed

to have been a girl's head. Then another soldier stuck a knife into the head and twisted the knife to make the hole bigger. He pulled out the blade, grabbed the head, and drank the mixture of blood and brains that flowed out ... this is what is happening in Timor; this is what the regular Indonesian army is doing.» *(Letter, 28 December 1982).*

Indonesia was still insisting that it went into Timor to help a wretched population. The same missionary contested that argument:

«If the people of East Timor are a poor people, why are they still pillaging them after 7 years?

If they are a hungry people, and they are, why have they confined them to artificial settlements by roadsides, far from their gardens, fields and plantations? If they are an uneducated people ... why did they kill everyone who had any schooling?; why have they focused particularly on slaughtering students, claiming they were Communists ...?

If the people are happy with integration, if they want to be an Indonesian colony, then what is the purpose of so many battalions of elite troops from the different branches of the armed forces and police, and the colossal apparatus of people paid to listen in on and keep watch over, night and day, even the simplest inhabitant?

What is the meaning of the infinite number of cars, vehicles and motorcycles with military number plates that continually roam the streets and roads?

If the people are happy, and if annexation is a solution to their problems, then what are the tanks that patrol the streets of Dili at night doing?» *(letter, 28 December 1982).*

In such an atmosphere of surveillance and fear of reprisals, very few were in a position to express themselves freely, even to foreign visitors. The head of the Catholic Church of East Timor was an exception, however. He spoke out to the members of a mission sent by the World Council of Churches which was, unusually, given permission to go to East Timor in 1982. The members of the mission were accompanied at all times by Indonesian security officers, and could not even get away from them when they went to meeting with Monsignor da Costa Lopes.

The head of the Catholic Church in Dili did not hesitate to talk in the presence of the security agents, and he dared to criticise the negative aspects of the Indonesian Government's policy, concluding that the problem of East Timor is not a military problem but a political and humanitarian problem and, consequently, it cannot be solved by violence.

(Report of the World Council of Churches mission, 1982)

1983

TALKS AND ULTIMATUM

Colonel Purwanto, Military Commander of Timor, proposes negotiations, but General B. Murdani puts an end to them.

«Our army is ready to destroy you»

(General B. Murdani, message to Xanana Gusmão)

In March 1983, Colonel Purwanto, Military Commander of East Timor, proposed holding negotiations with the guerrilla movement, which had become considerably more active. There had even been signs of carelessness and rebellion within the Indonesian Armed Forces. Monsignor Costa Lopes reported:
«In 1981, near Bazartete, a few kms. from Dili, many Indonesian soldiers handed over their weapons to Fretilin and blatantly refused to fight. They were brought before an ad hoc military court and sentenced.» *(Monsignor da Costa Lopes, Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 3 July 1983).*

What the occupying authorities undoubtedly had in mind was to propose negotiations, offer the leaders favourable conditions, and then allow the situation to drag on and stagnate. General Yusuf, then Minister of Defence, had used that very strategy 20 years before, to put an end to the separatist movement in the Indonesian island of Sulawesi, when he was military commander there.

Guerrilla leader Xanana Gusmão agreed to preliminary talks, which were held on 21 and 23 March in resistance controlled territory. The banderole of the RDTL (Democratic Republic of East Timor, the name adopted when independence was unilaterally declared a few days before the invasion) and the Fretilin flag, both hoisted at the scene of the meetings, would later give the lie to Indonesia's claims that the talks were to discuss the surrender of the resistance. Xanana Gusmão insisted there be two pre-conditions to any negotiations on the basic question: a ceasefire, and keeping the UN Secretary General informed about the negotiations.

Colonel Purwanto readily agreed to a ceasefire: he hoped that, once the guerrillas had reunited with their families and were back to normal life, they would abandon the fight. As for keeping the UN Secretary General informed, the Colonel said it was up to the government in Jakarta to decide, and asked Xanana Gusmão to wait for the reply. The Indonesians used the ensuing suspension of hostilities to spread rumours that the Timorese had given up their struggle. An Australian parliamentary mission, invited to visit Timor, took Indonesia's side. Bill Morrison, leading the mission, refused to accompany unarmed guerrillas who intercepted his car and invited him to visit a nearby camp, where the resistance leaders were waiting to meet him. He did, however, write a report praising the Indonesian military who had used ***«persuasion instead of weapons»***.

At that time, the Timorese had great difficulty in communicating with the outside world. Initial reports of a ceasefire agreement were categorically denied by Indonesia, and the Timorese lacked the means to prove that, in fact, there had been both a ceasefire and talks. However, an opportunity unexpectedly arose when Jakarta's request, made 2 years before to the Vatican for the removal of Monsignor Costa Lopes (following his public condemnation of the Mount Santo Antonio massacre), was finally answered in May 1983. The Vatican had agreed to the Bishop's removal. When he left Timor, Monsignor Costa Lopes was able to confirm not only the ceasefire but also the talks, of which he had photographic evidence.

In June, General Benny Murdani who, meanwhile, had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, presented the Timorese resistance movement with an ultimatum. In a message to Xanana Gusmao, he stated: ***«Our army is ready to destroy you if you are not prepared to co-operate with our Republic.»*** *(June 1983).* He stipulated that the month of August would be the deadline for the surrender.

Some guerrillas, who under the terms of the ceasefire had returned unarmed to their villages, were killed by Indonesian soldiers. Although such cases were rare, they made Murdani's threats all the more believable.

In August, before the deadline, the leadership of the resistance instructed the Timorese militia, armed by Indonesia, to join the resistance in the bush. Indonesia retaliated with reprisals, such as the massacre in Cráras/



Bibiléu. The Timorese militia in Cráras, a camp in which the people of several villages in the Bibiléu district had been re-grouped, decided to go and join the resistance. Before doing so, they killed the soldiers from the Indonesian platoon and made off with their weapons. Over the next few days, the Indonesian army slaughtered most the of people in the camp — defenceless civilians. The survivors were taken to a new settlement in Klalerek-Mutin.

A priest who managed to get to Klalerek-Mutin over a year later wrote:

A few statistics relating to Klalerek-Mutin:

Confined to Klalerek-Mutin:		**1983**
Number killed:		**1278**
Disappeared:		**56**
Widowers:		**46**
Widows:		**122**
Orphans:		
	boys	**25**
	girls	**27**
Fatherless children:		
	boys	**43**
	girls	**181**
Medical Assistance:		
	doctors	**none**
	nurses	**none**
	medicines	**none**

For working in the fields they were given:		
	crowbars	**6**
	machetes	**10**
	lifting hooks	**20**
Seeds:		
	corn	**6 sacks**
	rice	**9 sacks**

Diseases:

Beriberi, malaria, sores, cough, pneumonia, tuberculosis, rickets, debility.

General state of extreme hunger and dire poverty.

November 1984

1984

STRATEGIC VILLAGES – STARVATION USED AS A WEAPON

For military reasons, the people were not allowed to go outside the camps. Guard duties and forced labour imposed by the military left little time for the Timorese to do agricultural work that was vital for their very survival.

In an attempt to isolate the guerrillas, the Indonesian army enclosed the Timorese population in tightly guarded camps. There was no freedom of movement and they were forbidden to go outside the camps. Since the predominant consideration in choosing the location for the camps had been military strategy, they had been set up in places where surveillance would be easy and without much thought to the area's potential for agriculture. Forced to leave the lands they had cultivated and to which they were accustomed, the people often found that the only land available to them was either not very suitable or totally unfit for cultivation. Rice, the staple food of the Timorese, had to be substituted by corn which was easier to grow.

Not only was the quality of the soil poor, but now the amount of land available to the Timorese was limited. The reasons for this were:

- surveillance (once again, the main consideration). The military restricted cultivation to a belt of land around the dwellings, the size of which would depend on the configuration of the terrain and extent of guerrilla activity in the zone. The width of the strips varied from between 50 metres to 2 kilometres, but they usually measured between 200 and 500 metres.
- lack of available labour was the second reason for limiting the amount of land for cultivation. Most of the men had been killed, and those who had survived were made to keep guard in the resettlement camps every night, and even to serve as carriers, guides or shields during military operations... The remaining men, and sometimes women too, were also forced to do various kinds of work «for the good of the community» (e.g. road building). After doing night guard duties and other jobs, the men were left with little time and energy to work on the land for themselves.

Reports, smuggled out of Timor, give an idea of what life was like in the camps:

In the Sepelata, Irafalai, Fuiloro and Txauluturo camps: ***«Control of entry and departure is carried out at the house of the 'Babinsa' (camp military authority). Departures are at 08.00 hrs. and entry is at 12.00 or 13.00 hrs. Nearly every day the 'babinsas' order the alarm to be sounded at random times, and everyone is rounded up for a roll call, to check whether anyone has entered or left without passing through control. The people are forced to do road building work every day, and get no pay for their work. But between 6 and 9 in the morning, before leaving to work on the roads, they have to clean all around the military posts. Sometimes, the people leave the fields, escorted by a section of the 312 Battalion, to go and look for coconuts or kumbilis (edible tubers) around the areas where the now abandoned villages are. When they get back, each person has to hand over to the military two coconuts and any other foodstuff they want.***

Since last May, the people in these four camps have been starving. In Sepelata, 11 families have only one box of corn left; a few have half a box; most have nothing to eat at all. In the 'Mission' (Fuiloro), 25 families still have one box; a few have half a box; most now have nothing left. In Txauluturo, 6 families have one box; most are starving. The lack of arable land, and low productivity from the land that is cultivated are the causes of the starvation.

In 1984, Mehara and Porlomano are among the worst hit camps; people there are dying of starvation. With no harvest, and under rigorous surveillance, the people are reduced to eating leaves which they gather when the occupation forces allow them to go out into the forest or when they are made to go in search of guerrillas.

As there is nothing to eat at all, when there is no sign of guerrillas about they round everybody up to go into the forest to look for wild tubers and gather leaves and coconuts in order to survive.

The same is happening in Luro, Quelicai, Venilale, Loibulu, Laleia and many other places. In Iliomar, dire hunger is leading people to cut down the palms that grow around the gate (of the camp), in order to eat

the tender parts. In Tutuala, for security reasons, the people from the four settlements of Pitileli are kept within the narrow confines of the village, with neither houses nor palm trees. There is also nothing to eat throughout the territory that runs from Mehara to Txauluturo.» *(Resistance document, January 1985).*

«They say that there is no hunger in Timor, but in Iliomar, in January alone, 110 people died from beriberi.» *(letter to Monsignor Costa Lopes from a Christian of Viqueque, 2 Mar. 1985).*

In the Dili region, regardless of their own needs, families were forced to hand over 20% of their produce to feed the Indonesian military forces.

In spite of all this adversity, the people still managed to help the armed resistance movement: the new Apostolic Administrator, appointed by the Holy See, told a journalist that the Indonesian army:
«terrorises the population, taking reprisals against the villages that provide Fretilin with food, (...) to deter them from doing so, they carry out summary executions in front of the people.» *(AFP, 1984).*

Timor aspires to the full expression of its own individuality, and to stop that is equivalent to not just physical genocide but also cultural genocide, the latter being more serious than the former because if affects not only those who die but also those who survive, both present generations and the generations to come.
(Note from the Permanent Council of the Portuguese Episcopal Conference, 28 March 1984).

1985

PRIORITY IS GIVEN TO BIRTH CONTROL OVER HEALTH CARE

«131 health clinics»

(Ali Alatas, Ambassador to the UN)

«183 family planning clinics»

(Dr. Gorde, Director of Family Planning in Dili)

In a territory with a population that had not only been brutally decimated but also reduced to a deplorable state of health, the Indonesian Government allocated more resources to family planning than to health care. Strangely enough, the World Bank provided Indonesia with the financial backing to do so.

The World Bank, which was supporting family planning programmes in Indonesia, agreed to extend its aid to East Timor, without taking into consideration the occupied territory's particular circumstances. It provided 90% of the finance for the building of the Family Planning Clinic in Dili and, later, the clinics built in each district. The Clinic in Dili alone cost 648 million Rupees in 1985 — as much as East Timor's entire health budget for one year.

Ever since 1983, Monsignor Costa Lopes, Catholic Bishop of Dili, had been denouncing the fact that:
«men and women are sterilised, without even being told when, for whatever reason, they undergo surgery.»

In March 1985, his successor, Monsignor Belo, criticised the way Indonesia was implementing the family planning programme:
«It consists of simply going from village to village and indiscriminately distributing contraceptives (pills, injections and others). They give no advice to the people first; they give injections to uninformed women. We deplore, reject and condemn a family planning programme which does not inform the people concerned.»

At the inauguration of the Dili Family Planning Clinic, the Director, Dr. Gorde, an Indonesian, revealed that in East Timor there were 183 family planning clinics for 442 villages. Also at that time, by way of demonstrating his government's commitment to health matters, Ali Alatas, then Indonesia's Ambassador to the UN, affirmed that there were 131 health clinics in the territory. Indonesia was, therefore, treating family planning as more of a priority than basic health care! This approach is even more disturbing considering that, if East Timor did have a demographic problem, it was due to its diminishing, not growing population. In 1980, Urip Widodo, Indonesian Minister for labour and transmigration, had stated:
«It is impossible to develop this Province when such a small number of people live there.»

In 1986, the European Assembly of Family Planning Associations, meeting in London, requested clarification from their Indonesian counterpart about family planning in East Timor. The IPPA (Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association) replied by simply quoting official figures.

Indonesia spends proportionately more money on family planning in East Timor than it does in Indonesia itself: more than double per family of childbearing age, and nearly five times more per couple using family planning.

The number of family planning officers is relatively higher in Timor than in Indonesia, but they organise fewer public sessions (1:4), have less meetings with the village chiefs (1:4) and make fewer house calls (1:15).

Regarding the types of contraception used by Timorese women, the Indonesian association revealed that the injection method was by far the most widely used (57%), followed well behind by the pill (29%) and the intra-uterine device (10%). Oddly enough, on this point the IPPA did not provide the figures for Indonesia, which would have made a comparison possible. However, as the figures are available from other sources (the Portuguese daily Diário de Notícias published them in November 1985) the comparison which the Indonesian association did not want to facilitate can, in fact, be made: In Indonesia, the pill is in the lead (65%), followed by the intra-uterine device (27%) and other methods (8%). That 8% includes the subcutaneous implant, a method used in Asia, and the injections. Clearly, the methods used in East Timor and Indonesia are totally different: 57% Depo-Provera injections in East Timor and only about 5% in Indonesia. According to information gathered in East Timor, all Timorese women must have a card on which their



Dili hospital, built by the Portuguese, converted into a military hospital by the Indonesians.

injections and pills taken are recorded, as well as the date on which the dose is to be administered. On the date indicated, they must attend the family planning clinic, and be given the injection or pill. Often, the woman is made to take the pill in the presence of the family planning officer.

In 1991, following a public protest by the Bishop of Dili about a governmental note associating the Timorese Catholic Church with Indonesia's family planning programme, women in Liquiça tore up their clinic cards, but not even then did they manage to get out of keeping to the programme.

Regarding the people's health in East Timor, Governor Mário Carrascalão, contradicting the official statistics, told the Indonesian parliament in August 1989 that ***«malaria is still rife»*** and that ***«70% of the population is suffering from tuberculosis»***.

Considering the drastic reduction in the number of East Timor's population during the past 11 years, and the fact that the territory already had a low population density before the Indonesian invasion, what is the justification for this birth control program? What has been done up to now to ascertain whether the Timorese are being subjected to coercion, abuse or even worse?

(Letter from 40 US Senators to Secretary of State George Schulz, 27 July 1987)

1986

INDONESIAN COLONISATION

There are proportionately 20 times more military personnel in East Timor than in Indonesia.

«The Timorese are becoming second-class citizens in their own country.»

(Monsignor Belo)

In July 1986, Indonesia launched a new generalised military offensive. One Timorese wrote:
«after arriving on troop transport 509, three battalions landed in Dili on 5 September. Later, they drove around the city several times in military vehicles to terrorise the people. They finally left in the direction of the mountains.» *(letter, 26 August 1986).*
The same letter put the number of troops then on the ground at ***«50 battalions».***

On average, throughout the past 20 years of occupation, the number of Indonesian troops present in East Timor has exceeded 20,000, for a population of about half a million Timorese. That is equivalent to 40 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants — 20 times more than in Indonesia, where the figure is 2 per 1,000 (which in itself is high).

To this number of military personnel must be added about 100,000 Indonesian civilians, farmers and, above all, civil servants and traders.

The farmers mostly arrived under the transmigration plans, which are applied throughout Indonesia. Officially, they are meant to transfer populations from highly populated islands (Java, Bali, etc.) to the less populated ones. In reality, however, their objectives often have more to do with the colonisation and submission of distant territories where less sympathy is felt towards the regime. In 1985, the Minister for transmigration announced that he was preparing to introduce locations for 'Sapta Marga' type transmigration, in the ***«troubled zones»*** such as East Timor, the north-west Sumatra and, in particular, West Papua. With the ***«Sapta Marga»*** type of transmigration, a number of the migrants would be military personnel with their families.

Arriving on the army's heels, the civil servants and traders got the best jobs and have benefits which are not given to the Timorese. Living in conquered territory, these Indonesian civilians feel dependent on the military and often work as informers for them.

The extent of the presence and influence of the Indonesians is such that, even in 1984, Monsignor Belo told AFP:
«I am afraid of a Javanisation of East Timor. In Dili, we often ask ourselves: where are the Timorese? (...) Indonesia is starting to colonise us (...) the Timorese are becoming second-class citizens in their own country.» *(AFP, July 1984).*

In Indonesia, power is based on the so-called 'tripod': the army, the police, and the civil service. Two out of the three feet are militarised, but in the zones where security problems are thought to exist, military influence even pervades the civil service where its powers outweigh those of the civil servants.

Indonesia appointed a few token Timorese to management positions in the territory's provincial administration. The highest post, that of Governor of the «Province», has always been given to a Timorese, but his powers are limited. Although Mário Carrascalão was «Governor» of East Timor, when he requested permission to visit an acquaintance who had been arrested and tortured by the military in Dili, it was refused.

In 1991, the deputy director of a public service boasted to a foreign visitor that 50% of the personnel in his department were Timorese. He added, however, that in terms of authority within the service, the Timorese only had 10%.

In 1986, Governor Mário Carrascalão publicly complained that, 10 years after formal integration, East Timor was still considered a ***«special region»*** which, in Indonesian political jargon means a place where the military have extended authority. The Indonesian Government's response was enlightening: in April 1987 it appointed three Deputy-Governors, all Indonesian and all military.



In addition to their military and administrative powers, high-ranking Indonesian officers have even acquired influence over East Timor's economic activities. Either directly or by using third parties, they gained control over all import-export business in the 'Province', and set up monopolies. Trading in coffee, Timor's chief export, is the exclusive of PT Denok, a company dominated by generals, such as General Murdani (mastermind of the invasion) himself. They used to buy the coffee from the Timorese producers at prices which were nearly four times below the going rate in Indonesia.

On 17 July 1986, Indonesia celebrated the tenth anniversary of East Timor's integration, but only six foreign ambassadors accepted the invitation to join in the festivities: Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Morocco, Iran, and Singapore.

The European Parliament...

- **Considering that Indonesia has been occupying by force, in contempt of international law, the territory of East Timor since December 1975;**
- **Recalling the recommendations of the General Assembly of the UN Security Council, and the resolutions adopted by the Commission of Human Rights and by the Sub-Commission on the Protection of Minorities, which recognise East Timor's right to self-determination, and call on Indonesia to withdraw its forces from the territory (...)**
- **Calls on the member States of the European Community to utilise all diplomatic means possible in order to bring about peace and legality in East Timor;**
- **Calls upon the member States of the European Community to demand the participation of representatives of the Maubere people in all the negotiations on the definition of East Timor's future status (...)**

(Resolution adopted on 11 July 1986 by 163 votes in favour, 3 against and 4 abstentions)

1987

BOGUS ELECTIONS – BOGUS DEVELOPMENT

Bogus elections: 94% of votes in favour of the government of occupation

Bogus development: by the Indonesians, for the Indonesians

BOGUS ELECTIONS

The Indonesian Government always endeavoured to convince foreign governments that it had the backing of the Timorese population.

In the first elections held in 1982, Jakarta claimed that 99.5% of the votes cast were in support of the government, but the excessiveness of the figure itself, added to the fact that the number of votes supposedly cast exceeded even the number of voters on the electoral registers, stripped the result of all credibility.

«it was not recognised internationally as an expression of Timorese people's own will», as Mário Carrascalão, Governor of East Timor, told the Indonesian newspaper *'Kompas'* (24 July 1987).

The Indonesian electoral system is quite idiosyncratic: the military, the country's dominant political force, only allows three political parties to exist — Golkar, PDI and PPP — and even reserves 100 seats for them in Parliament. The Golkar party has been in power since the inception of the «New Order» government in 1965. The PDI and PPP have been given the role of opposition parties, though in reality they are not. Having learned from the inflated election result experience of 1982, General B. Murdani, who was both Army Commander-in-Chief and a prominent PDI leader, expressed his view in 1987 of what the election results ought to be to merit credibility:

«Golkar should not lose the elections because that would be negative for the image of the 'New Order'. However, neither should its victory be too spectacular, because that would be disadvantageous given that the New Order upholds democracy» *(20 Jan. 1987).*

This view clearly reveals the purpose of elections in the eyes of the regime, and the role assigned to the so-called 'opposition'.

The results gave the PDI 5.5% of the votes, while Golkar was credited with 94%. Mário Carrascalão was quick to point out:

«now that the PDI obtained 20,163 votes, the world can see that East Timor is free to vote for the party of its choice» *(Kompas, 24 July 1987).*

It was obvious that, in spite of its attempts to make the outcome more believable, what the regime most feared was that the election results might suggest the Timorese were not wholeheartedly in favour of integration. As for credibility, the Jakarta Government had, once again, fallen short.

BOGUS DEVELOPMENT

Indonesia's case for justifying its occupation of East Timor was based, from the outset, on the argument of development, which it claimed it had taken to the territory.

In spite of the figures for various areas (education and health are dealt with in a separate chapter) presented by the Government, Indonesia's development of East Timor has been harshly criticised, even by Indonesian observers. A team of scientists from the Gadjah Mada University, headed by Prof. Mobyarto, a professor of economy and head of the University's Research Centre, was allowed carry out investigation work in the territory in 1981 and 1989. The team was, therefore, able to make a comparative study of the situation based on an eight year interval. The team's final report stated that:

«material progress failed to resolve the social, economic and political problems resulting from the integration process, which caused heavy loss of life».

The Indonesian researchers spoke of the ***«trauma»,*** in which Timorese society was living, caused by the ***«war situation»*** and a ***«war economy»*** controlled by ***«monopolistic practices».*** They blamed their own country's massive military presence in Timor for the population's rejection of Indonesia: ***«even among the Timorese elite, there is a feeling of hatred because they*** (the armed forces) ***are seen as the cause of East Timor's paralysed economy».***

The Indonesian academics did not attribute military presence with all the blame for the ill-feeling. They maintained that the arrival of large numbers of their compatriots, who ***«inundated and installed themselves in the territory»*** were partly responsible. The Timorese invented a new term with which to describe these ***«foreigners»*** (a word used with inverted commas by the Indonesian researchers). They called them ***«Battalion***



702», because they would start work at 7 in the morning, would do nothing (0) of any use to anyone, and then return home at 2 in the afternoon!

In the view of the Indonesian research team, if to all this was added the element of ***«culture shock»*** — the sudden obligation on the Timorese to learn the language and history of Indonesia, to study Pancasila and memorise the names of Indonesia's heroes — then it was not surprising that ***«the Timorese do not share the views of the Indonesian Government on integration»***. *(Gadjah Mada University's report, May 1990).*

«Many (Timorese) have themselves experienced such torture, and many others have seen with their own eyes their fathers being killed, their mothers imprisoned, their brothers tortured...

The Timorese always saw the Indonesians as new colonisers. This view has been shared, until now, by Timor's clergy: there are, in fact, many Indonesian civil servants who arrive to Timor with the sole aim of getting rich through corrupt practices, so most Timorese are afraid to go near them; much of the land belonging to the people, and mission houses are used as bases, or barracks for soldiers, and some of the Diocese's coffee plantations were confiscated by the Government; communication among the people is difficult because the Timorese do not speak the Indonesian language, and the Indonesian soldiers and civil servants do not try to learn the dialect spoken in Timor. (...)

The handling of the case of East Timor requires new attitudes and new working methods. The outdated, militarily style approaches ought to be left behind because, apart from being ineffective, they are harming the process of social integration. It is necessary to reduce, if possible, military personnel in East Timor, in order to prevent feelings of coercion in the implementation of development programmes.

The people's apathy and indifference towards the programmes are proof not only that there is no mutual adaptation between us and the Timorese, but also — and especially — that the rejection of our presence is growing and developing in a natural process»

(Report of the Gadjah Mada University, May 1990)

1988

EDUCATION OR "INDONESIANISATION"

«In the field of education, the enemy is seeking to kill our culture»

(letter from a Timorese)

«.. priority having been given to quantity, to the detriment of quality»

(Australian parliament)

From 12 to 20 July 1988, Timorese secondary school students demonstrated in the streets of East Timor, for the first time since Indonesia's military invasion. Most of the students, who would have been small children at the time of the invasion 13 years before, were among the new generation which the Indonesians had believed they would transform into *«true Indonesians»*.

The invaders had been determined to wipe out any signs of the teaching provided by the Portuguese, before setting up their own education system.

The occupiers thought that by obliterating the traces of the existing civilisation they could more easily impose their own. Colonel Kalangie, Military Commander of East Timor, explained to US journalist Rod Nordland that his armed forces were bringing ***«the new Indonesian civilisation to Timor»*** and regretted that ***«to civilise this backward people»*** was not as easy as he would have wished *(The Philadelphia Enquirer, 28 May 1982).*

Indonesia's method of teaching appeared, essentially, to be an attempt to regiment the young people. As such, it was not understood by the Timorese:
«In the field of education, the enemy is seeking to kill our culture. The study of the Indonesian language is obligatory. Students spend their time singing the Indonesian national anthem, and doing a lot of physical education that consists mainly of marching through the streets of the city displaying their uniforms» *(letter from a Timorese to Monsignor Costa Lopes, 20 April 1986).*

Comparisons with the numbers of schools and pupils in Portuguese times were used and abused as propaganda with which to impress foreign governments, but both the Timorese and the Catholic Church argued that far more had been lost in quality than had been gained in quantity. Even the Australian Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee admitted that:
«The main aim of education (now) is to enable the largest possible number of children to get to school, priority having been given to quantity to the detriment of quality» *(report, Sept. 1983).*

In the allocation of places at secondary schools, children of Indonesian military personnel and civil servants were given preference over the Timorese. The first signs of protest against this discrimination appeared in 1987, and quickly took the form of protests against occupation itself:
«They wrote on the walls with sprays: 'Timor is our country', and 'We want Freedom and Independence'. It was the first time something like this had happened. We felt satisfied, but we knew there would be reprisals» *(Reinaldo dos Santos, refugee, Anglo-Portuguese News, Dec. 1988).*

Next came the street demonstrations in Dili and Baucau, the territory's two largest cities. Mário Carrascalão, Governor of the 'Province', tried to minimise the importance of the protests:
«300 students from the first years of secondary school were protesting because they were not given access to the following years. No one can get to the next teaching level without first passing the tests, and the same conditions must apply to East Timorese students and Indonesian students from other provinces alike, because there can be no special privileges.» *(Tempo, Aug. 1988).*

It is not clear to whom this statement of principle was addressed: the rebellious students or the authorities, complacent with a system which favours Indonesian students. Not even the tests mechanism, invoked by the Governor, could stop the teachers, who were overwhelmingly Indonesian, from giving preferential treatment to the children of their own compatriots.

The situation in schools belonging to the Catholic Church was not much better. They were totally dependent upon the government, and the same integrationist aims were imposed:

«The government is completely free to appoint and substitute teachers, even without letting the religious

authorities know», Monsignor Belo complained to the Apostolic Nuncio in Jakarta, adding that: ***«the curricula are the same as those of the official schools, and the teaching is carried out in Indonesian. Everything is Indonesian»*** (report sent to the Nuncio, 1989).

The Indonesian researchers from the Gadjah Mada University gathered testimonies from young Timorese, pupils at the Gleno secondary school, which suggested that the discrimination went beyond the school gates: ***«Why should we bother going to school if, once we have completed the courses, we cannot get the jobs for which we are qualified? All jobs in the public sector are out of bounds to us. A recently arrived (Indonesian) civil servant, who gets a management position in a public service, brings along his friends, or at least people from his own place of origin, with him»*** *(Gadjah Mada University report, May 1990).*

During the street demonstrations, the students used to shout out: ***«If we have no places in schools, we'll go Xanana Gusmao's school»***, but Xanana told them to stay where they were in the towns and villages to reinforce the civilian resistance movement which, in the years to come, would emerge as a vital force in the fight against the invaders.

The European Parliament, (...)

- **Considering that the cultural identity of the people of East Timor is being destroyed, namely by the imposition of a foreign language and elimination of the national language; by the official diffusion of values which are alien to the traditions and history of East Timor; by the destruction of the family and social structure, and by transmigration (...)**
- **Condemns the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia and confirms the right of self-determination of the people of East Timor;**
- **Defends the right of the people of East Timor to maintain, develop and affirm their cultural, linguistic and religious identity derived from their own history;**
- **Calls on all governments in the Community to halt the sale of military equipment to Indonesia until the illegal occupation of East Timor is brought to an end; (...)**

(Resolution adopted by 164 votes in favour, 12 against and 15 abstentions, Sept. 1988)

1989

EASING RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT – THE POPE'S VISIT

3,000 arrests before President Suharto's visit

«Welcome to East Timor, 27th Province of Indonesia»

(placard welcoming the Pope)

The student unrest, aggravated by unemployment, led to increasingly frequent public expression of the hostility felt towards Indonesia. Governor Mário Carrascalão believed, or said he believed, that if the economic situation were to improve, opposition would peter out. He presented the Indonesian President with a proposal to lift restrictions on movement:

1 - free circulation for Timorese within East Timor; (until then, Timorese wishing to go to another part of the territory had to obtain a pass — 'surat-jalan' — from the military)

2 - free circulation between East Timor and «the rest» of Indonesia.

In the Governor's view, these two measures would: help to encourage business initiatives and facilitate trade among the Timorese; make the entry of Indonesian investors and capital possible, and enable the unemployed to leave East Timor to seek work on other islands.

In spite of its limited scope, this partial lifting of restrictions met with opposition from the Indonesian military chiefs in the territory, who feared that their monopoly of many sectors of the economy could be jeopardised.

In December 1988, President Suharto visited East Timor, in what may have been a test of the relaxation of restraints. The military's secret services announced they had uncovered a plot to kill the President, and proceeded to arrest 3,000 people in Dili, who were said to belong to a secret religious association called «Yayasan Santo António», which no one had ever heard of before. The President cut short his stay, which was limited to Dili, but upheld his decision to partially lift restrictions and «open» the territory in 1989.

After being postponed on several occasions, Pope John Paul II's visit to Indonesia was announced by the Vatican: it would take place in October, and a stop off in East Timor would be on his itinerary. The visit was probably in the interests of both parties: the Pope would be visiting an island where over 80% of the population was Catholic, while for the Indonesian Government it would be an endorsement, in the eyes of the international community, of its sovereignty over the territory which, even after 14 years of occupation, had still not been recognised.

Fearing that the occupiers would use the Pope's presence for their own political ends, the Church of East Timor stated it would prefer a postponement until there was no longer a risk that the visit would be exploited by Indonesia. The Vatican, however, did not concur. The Military Commander of Timor criticised the Bishop and priests for their opposition to the visit and expressed his satisfaction: ***«We managed to get the Pope to come here, we managed it!»***

Some journalists realised that there was a difference between the Vatican's position and that of the local church. A French reporter put the question to the Bishop of Dili: ***«Is it true that you were reprimanded by the Vatican for your letter to the UN?»***
«Yes», replied the Bishop. ***«We do not share the same point of view. They think I am being political. If I were in Rome, perhaps I would think in the same way. But I live here. I see the people's sufferings, and share them. It was my duty to write that letter»*** *(Ouest-France, 13 Oct. 1989).*

At Dili airport a huge placard depicting the Pope's arrival proclaimed in English ***«Welcome to East Timor, 27th Province of Indonesia».*** In a clear attempt to make political gains out of the visit, Vatican and Indonesian flags, and gigantic pictures of the Pope and President Suharto dominated the area where the Pope was to celebrate Mass.

Most of the journalists had already left the area when, as the Mass ended, a few hundred young Timorese moved towards the Pope and unfurled cloths bearing their written messages: ***«The Maubere people greet the Holy Father»,*** and ***«Viva Independence!».*** In spite of efforts by the military to confiscate film belonging to the few photographers present, some photos managed to slip through the net and the issue of Timor, once again, attracted the attention of the international press.

The Bishop of Dili later revealed that he had asked the Pope to intercede on behalf of the demonstrators, who had ***«only expressed their discontent with the current situation in Timor».*** Regardless of the appeal, the young people were arrested, interrogated and forced into accusing some priests of having instigated the demonstration. Some of the young people were never seen again.



After the Pope had celebrated mass on 12 October there were numerous arrests: two of my friends, Jacob Xavier and Virgílio Costa, were detained at Senopati III, a Commando barracks, and tortured there. I escaped that fate by hiding for a few nights in the woods near Dili, but knowing that the military were threatening to take my family hostage, I sought refuge in the Bishop's residence on 26 October.

About 38 young people were already there. The Military Commander, General Mulyadi, and other authorities, tried to make us leave, but the Bishop, Monsignor Belo, took on the responsibility of our protection.

The tension built up until 5 November when the Military Commander and other officers entered the Bishop's residence and threatened to take away the Bishop if we did not come out of our own accord. We left after the Commander promised us, in front of the Bishop, that we would not be tortured and that, after a short interrogation, we would be released...

I was tortured by Colonel Naingolan and other military from Intelligence: burns with lighted cigarettes, electric shocks, a dagger stuck into my back, punches to my head, gun muzzles pointed at my chest, head and into my mouth. My friends were given the same treatment. The torturers wanted us to say that the Timorese priests had encouraged us to hold the demonstration in front of the Pope. The interrogations and torture lasted for 15 days.

On 17 January 1990, hundreds of young people took part in a demonstration in front of John Monjo, the US Ambassador visiting Dili. They were protesting against the repression and called for our release. Major Heri took me from my cell and led me to where the demonstration was taking place, so that I would appeal to the protesters to go back to their homes. I refused, saying that they were doing precisely what I myself had done. One demonstrator, Julião Mau Siri, was taken away by Col. Gatot, Col. Bimo's successor as head of the Secret Service. Later, he came to show me my companion, with his head covered in blood and his back cut by a bayonet. But I still would not give in. Then they threatened to finish us off. Major Heri also insisted that I should give the names of the demonstrators I had seen...

(Excerpts from the testimony of Donaciano Gomes to the Commission of Human Rights, Feb. 1991)

1990

REPRESSION POLICY

«We shall crush them all! I repeat, we shall crush them all!»

(B. Murdani, Minister of Defence)

«We ought to admit that we were wrong. For the past 15 years, the Indonesian Government and its armed forces have adopted a deplorable approach to the issue»

(M. Carrascalão)

The repression unleashed in the wake of the Pope's visit prompted US Ambassador, John Monjo, to go to Dili in January to find out what was really going on. Fearing that the Ambassador would hear only the government's version of events, some Timorese invaded the Hotel Turismo, in which the Ambassador was staying, to tell him their side of the story. The Ambassador listened to them but, when he left to meet with the Governor, the military charged mercilessly on the young men as they left the hotel.

When the Ambassador learned what had transpired, he went to the hospital and spoke to two of the injured demonstrators, expressing his regrets about the incident. Later, the Chief of Police apologised for the brutality (***«mistakes by the police and soldiers»***), and said it would not happen again. Making the most of the opportunity, large numbers of Timorese spilled out on the streets and demonstrated for two days against Indonesia and in favour of independence.

There was no further repression while the Ambassador was in Dili, but as soon as he returned to Jakarta, General B. Murdani, Minister of Defence, summoned 400 people, including the Timorese civil servants in positions of some authority, to the parliament building and warned: ***«If there are any further demonstrations against Indonesia when parliamentarians or foreign delegations are visiting Timor, it will be the military that responds to the demonstrators, with its weapons».***

The General used the opportunity to say that he was aware that many civil servants still supported the resistance, and that the army knew exactly who they were:
«they too will be treated firmly. (...) Don't go proclaiming 'I am a Timorese patriot' because there are no Timorese patriots. There are only Indonesian patriots. (...) If anyone disagrees with that view, he should tender his resignation from the administration, and then he can go and join the fight, which is already lost, up in the mountains, eating, from time to time, the food sent from the villages. (...)
I have already told you: if you try to organise your own State, and if the movement is strong, strong enough, it will be crushed by ABRI (Indonesian armed forces). ***ABRI might fail once, but it will start again a second time, and a third. (...) We shall crush them all» I repeat, we shall crush them all!»***

This speech by the Minister of Defence (army chief at the time of the invasion), intended to emphasise the irreversibility of integration, in fact revealed that, 15 years after the invasion, the overwhelming majority of Timorese were still opposed to integration.

The success of the demonstrations added further fuel the eagerness of Timorese youth to take part in the protests. Even the youngest of them wanted to do their share, and would approach Indonesians in the streets of Dili and ask innocently ***«Kapan Pulang, Pak» (When are you going back to your country, Sir?).***

On 17 July, the day considered by the Indonesians to be the anniversary of East Timor's integration with Indonesia, Fretilin flags were hoisted in several Dili schools.

On 4 September, the diocese of Dili celebrated its 50th anniversary with an open-air mass in the capital, which was attended by 50,000 people. The Vatican's diplomatic representative to Indonesia took part in the service. The mass ended in a pro-independence demonstration. Each act of protest against integration was violently put down by the military, but the repression no longer seemed to have any dissuasive effect.

In October, incidents of a different kind occurred. The authorities tried to provoke the young people to discover who the ring-leaders were in order to punish them:
— on 8 October, at Dili's No. 4 Secondary School, during the speech (pengarahan) delivered every Monday when the Indonesian flag was hoisted, a school inspector said:



«When Indonesia arrived, the people of East Timor were very backward. The people were very stupid (...) It was Indonesia that had to teach everything, to lead, to push forward towards development, to build roads and houses with more than one storey (...) The Catholic Church does not act according to the teachings of Christ, but according to Marxist-Leninist ideology because of Fretilin's dominance, and that is precisely what Indonesia came to put right».

The students protested against the speaker, but the military, who were already waiting outside the school, intervened with violence.

A week later, the words ***«When East Timor is independent, we will finish off Suharto's lackeys»*** – appeared painted on a wall near the Paulo VI Catholic School. The military invaded the school and demanded to know who was responsible. 26-year-old Claúdio Boavida pointed out that, in a place constantly patrolled by the army and police, the neat handwriting meant that only they themselves, or someone with their permission, could have written the sentence on the wall. Claúdio was taken away by the soldiers and never seen again. Even the 'Governor' told AFP that the writing could only have been a provocation.

«An atmosphere of fear and repression prevails in East Timor», people «who demand respect for human rights and political freedom» are arrested and tortured. «In the light of the tragic and persistent consequences of 15 years of conflict in East Timor, the US ought to support a process of unconditional peace talks between the parties directly concerned.»

(Letter from 223 members of the US Congress to Secretary of State James Baker)

1991

MASSACRE AT SANTA CRUZ AND OIL EXPLORATION DEALS

Peaceful demonstration ends with 271 killed, 250 missing and 382 wounded

During the talks held between Portugal and Indonesia, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, the parties agreed to organise a mission of Portuguese MPs to East Timor. Such a visit, said Pérez de Cuellar, ought to allow the MPs to gather first-hand information about the real situation in East Timor.

When he heard about the project, Xanana Gusmão relayed orders to the resistance movement to do nothing that might jeopardise the mission. For this reason, after 1990's plentiful street protests, 1991 was apparently calm.

At the negotiating table, Jakarta insisted that the Portuguese MPs should have official meetings with their Indonesian counterparts. They wanted to present the meetings to the Timorese as a sign of Portugal's recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over Timor. This news gave rise to discontent which Indonesia tried to put across as being anti-Portuguese and pro-Indonesia demonstrations.

In East Timor itself, the Indonesian military threatened to kill any Timorese expressing anti-Indonesia sentiment during the MPs' stay. In an interview for Portuguese newspapers, Monsignor Belo stated :
«you can be sure that there will be demonstrations» and, in a reference to what happened when the Pope visited, he added: ***«I am more apprehensive than happy, because I know from experience what the consequences will be for us».***

Concerned that the MPs' visit would be manipulated by the Indonesians, and making use of an act of censorship on the part of Indonesia (which refused to allow an Australian journalist to be one of the delegation of reporters chosen by Portugal to accompany the MPs), the Portuguese Government finally postponed the visit. The Timorese, however, with Xanana Gusmão's consent, decided to take full advantage of the exceptional presence of journalists (who had arrived in Dili clandestinely to cover the Portuguese MPs visit) by holding a pro-independence demonstration.

The demonstration march began at the end of a memorial mass, in Motael parish church, held for a young Timorese killed a fortnight earlier at the door of the same church. It was to end in the cemetery, where he had been buried. The military surrounded the cemetery and, without any warning, opened fire on the crowd of mainly young people. According to various witnesses, including the Bishop of Dili, scores of wounded were deliberately murdered in the hours and days that followed. With the aid of lists drawn up on the basis of testimonies from friends and relatives of the victims, it was possible to establish the identity of 271 dead, 250 missing, and 382 wounded.

«It was a demonstration by the enemy, that is clear ... they were carrying Fretilin flags and pictures of Xanana... I do not think you would have wanted to see these people seizing our soldiers' weapons», said Armed Forces Commander General Try Sutrisno, justifying his soldiers' actions, as he addressed the Indonesian parliament *(Reuters, 27 Nov. 1991)*. A few days before, during a meeting with officials from the National Defence Institute, he had been even more forthright: ***«They shouted out a lot of unacceptable things ... in the end, it was necessary to open fire on them. Delinquents such as these agitators ought to be killed and so they shall be, whenever it is necessary»*** *(The Guardian and Amnesty International, 21 Nov. 1991).*

Faced with international outcry, the Indonesian leadership U-turned, spoke of a ***«regrettable incident»,*** and finally agreed to appoint its own Commission of Inquiry, composed of military and government officials. The Commission's findings were totally lacking in credibility.

The official military version initially put the number of those killed at 19. (This figure corresponded to the number of bodies buried the day after the massacre in the Hera cemetery. Except for the body of a New Zealand student, who happened to be in Dili at the time of the massacre, none of these bodies were ever identified.) To satisfy international critics, however, the Commission concluded that there may have been about 50 killed.



Although the massacre plunged the question of East Timor into the spotlight of international organisations and the world's media, the place where most repercussions were felt in its aftermath was Indonesia itself. The news created a general awareness of what was really happening in East Timor, which the politico-military apparatus had always tried to keep hidden.

TIMOR GAP TREATY

1991 was also the year in which the Australian Government signed an agreement with Indonesia on joint oil drilling exploration in the Timor Sea. In spite of being a violation of international law, given that East Timor does not constitute part of Indonesia but is considered by the UN to be a ***«non-autonomous territory under Portuguese administration»,*** US and European oil companies associated themselves with the two governments to plunder East Timor's natural resources.

Portugal lodged a complaint with the International Court of Justice in The Hague, accusing Australia alone because the Indonesian Government does not recognise the Court's jurisdiction. In 1995, the Court ruled that it was incompetent to try the case against Australia because the other implicated party, Indonesia, did not accept its jurisdiction.

> **We call on the Indonesian Government to withdraw without delay all its Armed Forces from East Timor, and to give the people of East Timor total freedom to exercise the right of self-determination, in order to prevent any further bloodshed.**
>
> *(Forum of Student Senates of Indonesia, Bandung, 20-21 Nov. 1991)*

1992

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: THE TIMORESE HAVE RIGHT ON THEIR SIDE, BUT INDONESIANS HAVE THE STOCK MARKET ON THEIRS

«If Indonesia wants to intervene, the US hopes that it will do so efficiently and quickly, and without using our material»

(Newson, US Ambassador to Jakarta, 1975)

«The Security Council ... Calls upon the Indonesian Government to withdraw all its forces from the Territory without delay»

(UN Security Council Resolution 384, 22 December 1975)

The Santa Cruz massacre would have happened, like many others, without causing so much as a ripple, had it not been for the presence of foreign journalists and the film footage of the killing taken by one of the journalists and subsequently shown on TV in many countries. Even in Portugal where news of the massacre was widely reported by both TV and radio, the shock waves that ran through public opinion and the expressions of solidarity only occurred after footage of the massacre had been seen on TV.

For this reason, 1992 was the year in which protests about the situation in East Timor reached a peak. Even so, many governments went no further than expressing their concerns before international bodies or conveying them through diplomatic channels. Few took any practical steps: Holland and Canada suspended their economic aid to Indonesia; the US cut off its funding of a training programme for Indonesian military. Unfortunately, not all countries shared the same attitude and when Holland abandoned the leadership of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, which co-ordinates governmental aid to that country, France lost no time in stepping up its contribution and taking over leadership of the IGGI.

As the impact of the massacre subsided, economic and strategic relations with Indonesia once again became priorities for governments, just as they had done in 1975. Indonesia has the world's fourth largest population, and its military government, in power since 1964, allied itself with the West against Communism, earning Jakarta the conspiratorial silence of many countries.

Nevertheless, in December 1975, just days after the invasion, the UN Security Council still unanimously adopted a resolution ***«Deploring the intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in East Timor»,*** and calling upon ***«all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination, in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV)».*** *The Security Council also called upon* ***«the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay all its forces from the Territory».***

The US, which voted in favour of this resolution, had actually sanctioned the invasion a few days before it took place: President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had gone to Indonesia and, as Kissinger admitted in 1995, had discussed the matter with Suharto. Ford's position at the time would not have differed greatly from the response given (on Kissinger's instructions) by the then US Ambassador to Jakarta: ***«... the US hopes that Indonesia will do so efficiently and quickly, and without using our material».***

Each year, between 1976 and 1981, resolutions ***«reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence»*** were adopted by the UN General Assembly. The West's 'great' nations either abstained or voted against these resolutions, thereby counteracting their practical effects. In time, the number of countries prepared to vote on ineffective resolutions diminished.

In 1982, while reference to the right to self-determination and independence was maintained, a new requirement was introduced into the text of the resolution, which made it hard for the so-called great countries, that boasted of being states established according to legal principles, to reject. It requested:
«the Secretary General to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement».
This resolution was the basis of the formula which is

usually used in governmental and inter-governmental position statements that express support for the UN Secretary General's mission and the search for a ***«just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement».*** The mission entrusted to the Secretary General prevented de facto recognition of integration by mere abstention.

In 1989, Monsignor Belo launched his most official appeal to the international community in a letter addressed to the UN Secretary General:
«The decolonisation process of Portuguese Timor has still not been settled by the UN, and it is best that it should not be forgotten (...) I am asking you, Secretary General, to initiate in Timor the most normal and democratic of decolonisation processes — the holding of a REFERENDUM. Until now, the people themselves have not been consulted. It is Indonesia that says that the people of 'Timor Timur' have already chosen integration, but the Timorese themselves have never said that. Portugal wants Time to resolve the problem, and in the meantime, we are dying as a people and as a nation.» *(6 February 1989).*

At all times, the Vatican behaved just like the other States, determined to maintain good relations with Indonesia above all else. The Nuncio, the Vatican's ambassador to Jakarta, even said that: ***«the letter*** *(from Monsignor Belo to the UN)* ***neither reflects the aspirations of the Catholic Church nor of the people of East Timor»*** *(Jakarta Post, 14 June 1989).*

This led the clergy of East Timor to reply, with some bitterness:
«The clergy of Dili reject the views expressed by certain ecclesiastic figures ... we hope that our appeal will help both the lay and ecclesiastic authorities to understand how the Church and the people of East Timor feel, and what was expressed in the letter *(from Monsignor Belo)* ***of 6 February»*** *(letter, July 1989).*

The UN bodies which have most dealt with East Timor related issues are the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, the Special Committee on Decolonisation and the General Assembly itself. Various parliaments, in particular the European Parliament, the US Congress and Senate, international forums such as the Council of Europe, the ACP-EU Assemblies, etc., NGOs, Churches, and many others, have all contributed towards keeping the issue alive.

The United Nations is being urged by Portugal to challenge this vicious occupation. But the great democratic powers — America, Europe and Japan — have so far shown no serious determination to bring the Indonesian Government's crimes against humanity in East Timor to an end.

(The Times, editorial, 22 Nov. 1991)

1993 THE TRIAL OF XANANA GUSMÃO

«Who is afraid of the referendum? Why are you afraid of the referendum? I am not afraid of the referendum (...) under international supervision, (...) Anyone afraid of the referendum is afraid of the truth!»

(Xanana Gusmão in court, 1993).

On 20 November 1992, Xanana Gusmão was arrested at a hideout in Dili. Indonesia lost no time in announcing the death of the resistance, and put on a show in which Xanana appeared with the Governor and appealed to his comrades to surrender. The military authorities announced that the Church of East Timor had associated itself with the appeal when, in fact, Monsignor Belo had merely asked the priests to help any guerrillas who might decide to surrender in order to protect them from torture or even execution. Indonesia claimed the guerrillas were surrendering, but never produced any that had done so.

A new leader, Mau Huno, substituted Xanana Gusmao, revealing that, in spite of Xanana's long leadership (since 1981), continuity of the armed resistance did not depend exclusively on a charismatic chief. Mau Huno was later arrested in 1993 and his place was taken by Konis Santana. The underground movement in the cities also had its share of serious setbacks: in 1991, its key leader, identified following the Santa Cruz massacre, had to flee from Timor; in 1992, there was wave of arrests around the time Xanana was captured; in 1995, its leader mysteriously disappeared, and there were further mass arrests in October. Nevertheless, in spite of all the reprisals, the extent of the protests has increased in recent years.

Xanana Gusmao said one day that the golden rule of the resistance movement that faced a much stronger adversary was: ***«To look into our enemy's strength to find his weakness, and to turn our own weakness into strength».*** Xanana himself gave a brilliant demonstration of this principle.

The Indonesian generals, intoxicated by the capture of the leader they had been pursuing since 1981, wanted to take full advantage of their victory and exhibit him, not only to the Timorese but to the whole world to prove that

(...) This Court refers to 7 December 1975 as the day when a provisional government and local assembly were formed. In case the Indonesians have forgotten, I feel it my duty to remind them here, in this court, of the tragic day of 7 December of that year when Indonesian paratroopers were launched on Dili with the support of the marines.

7 December 1975 went down in history as the day of the shameful and treacherous invasion by Indonesia, the day on which Indonesian troops indiscriminately massacred the defenceless population of Dili, causing the death of thousands of old people, women and children, and also the death of an Australian journalist. (...)

A government which was established amidst the sound of shelling, by sea and by land, of a defenceless population — amidst the sound of advancing tanks and canon — can such a government claim to have any legal standing? (...)

I have heard a lot about the backwardness of Portuguese colonialism, as if I had not experienced it myself. They claim to show me the development of East Timor, as if this were a matter of statistics that could be compared with the Portuguese colonial period. I wonder if colonialism can be classified as good or bad (...) Just because for 400 years Portugal failed to develop East Timor, does it mean that we Timorese must pay for the mistakes of one era of colonialism while also paying for the crimes of another? Today, all the theories on colonialism or the fundamental reasons for, or emergence of new nations must be seen in the light of universal principles and international law, enshrined in the Charter of the UN. (...)

the guerrilla war and opposition to their sovereignty were well and truly over. Aware that he was not in a strong bargaining position, Xanana led his captors to believe he was going to make no great demands, but just wanted to be allowed to read his final defence plea himself in the court where he was to be tried. Overconfident of their own superiority, the Indonesian generals agreed to their vanquished prisoner's request. Xanana used the stage, set up by his enemies, to explain to a wider audience the reasons for his struggle and the resistance of his people.

It was the Indonesian regime that went on trial when they put Xanana on the stand and gave him a unique opportunity to state his case before the Indonesian people. In spite of the assurances he was given, the judge silenced the accused-accuser, thereby obliterating any remaining semblance of a fair trial.

Humanity aspires to a great ideal: the fulfilment of both individuals and peoples within a wide framework of freedom, law, justice and peace. Political realism is a theory imposed by the mighty, a conceit which subverted and subverts these standards. Political realism is a concept which grants rights only to the powerful and the strong so that they may act in their own interests, preventing the small and the defenceless from being able to defend themselves or from being able to refuse or act in any other way. When people speak of political realism, they are implicitly speaking of an inequality of circumstance, an inequality of situation between two parties involved in whatever process. And it is this inequality which means that the small and weak shall appear to be the willing apprentices of political realism. (...)

I never cease to be aware of the need for dialogue, with the participation of the Timorese. To any who cared to listen, I have always said that the Maubere people don't have any appreciation for the so-called 'pembangunan' (development). The problem is that it's not free. Freedom is what my people value and it is the aim of their struggle. (...) I appeal to the new generation of Indonesians to understand that the People of East Timor attach much more value to freedom, justice and peace than to the so-called development that has been carried out here with the help of Australia and the US, and with European countries who maintain close economic ties with Jakarta. (...)

I appeal to the Indonesian people to understand that, in conformity with the universal principles and international law, East Timor should be considered a non-autonomous territory in accordance with the provisions governing the process of decolonisation. (...) The problem is not that we want to dismember Indonesia; the problem is that East Timor was never Indonesian in the first place.

(Excerpts from Xanana Gusmão's defence statement to the District Court of Dili, May 1993)

1994

TIMORESE "COLLABORATORS" WITH THE INDONESIANS?

«If you don't kill him, then I will be the one who kills you»»

(Military commander of Muapitini addressing the local chief)

The so-called 'ninjas' are thugs hired for dirty and violent tasks. Naturally, the Indonesian military denies that it is they who recruit the 'ninjas' and pass off conflicts involving them as instances of Timorese quarrelling among themselves. Operating in the big cities which are rigorously controlled, especially at night, it is impossible that the 'ninjas' act without the consent of the army, and they are known to have been picked up by military trucks when it has been deemed convenient to get them out of the way quickly.

Timorese recruited by the Indonesians and pit against other Timorese is nothing new in East Timor. In the early days after the invasion, the Indonesians shielded themselves behind Timorese who, following the outbreak of the short civil war that set the UDT-Apodeti coalition against Fretilin, had taken refuge in West Timor.

The leaders of Apodeti, Arnaldo Araújo and João Martins, accepted such roles – one as the first head of the provisional government, the other as head of administration services of the local Assembly, set up by the Indonesians. However, on 1 November 1986, eleven years after the invasion, the two men were arrested, for reasons which were never clarified. João Martins was sacked from the position he held at the time as director of the «Province's» Social Services. He then offered his services to St. Joseph's school, owned by the Catholic Church. Oddly, the sacked director was invited to a Social Services party, during which he was taken ill, rushed to hospital and died. His family, convinced that he had been poisoned, requested an autopsy, but permission was denied by the authorities. Arnaldo Araújo, who was by then admitting his disillusionment with the path integration had taken, died in similar circumstances.

David Dias Ximenes, a Timorese officer in the Portuguese army, who was on Ataúro Island at the time of the invasion, and was flaunted by the Indonesian military as a 'representative' of East Timor at the celebrations of Indonesia's independence in Jakarta in 1976, was arrested in 1980 and sentenced to 17 years imprisonment.

João Maria dos Reis, a civil servant of the Portuguese administration in Dili, offered his services to the Indonesians when they occupied the city. Later, after managing to escape from Timor, he testified before the UN Commission on Human Rights that he had been tortured by the Indonesians, who wanted him make false statements about Francisco Lopes da Cruz and Mário Sanches (at the time, Deputy Governor of East Timor and Chairman of the Dili Council respectively), who had both been appointed by the occupying forces themselves. Lopes da Cruz was later sent to Jakarta and is currently an adviser to President Suharto. Mário Sanches died as a result of being viciously kicked in the stomach by Indonesian soldiers. João Maria dos Reis served Indonesia's propaganda machine by being the first Timorese allowed to visit his parents in Australia and return of his own «free will» to Timor (his wife and children had been forcibly kept behind in Dili). Later, his wife and children were permitted to leave and visit relatives, while he was held as a hostage. That is when he managed to escape, and he joined his family abroad.

On 6 December 1983, the population of Muapitini, a strategic village near Lospalos, was ordered to assemble in the local market square for a «big party». Five men from this camp (two were 'Hansips' — Timorese soldiers who assist the Indonesian military, one was a civil servant, another was the village of Wailoro's chief, and there was one other camp inhabitant) had been arrested on suspicion of being in contact with the armed resistance. The Indonesian soldiers picked out five well known people from the camp and gave them the 'honour' of killing their compatriots in front of all the people gathered there. ***«If you don't kill him, then I will be the one who kills you»,*** the Indonesian Military Commander told the local chief. ***«They were so shaken that they only managed to wound them, without killing them, so the Indonesians buried them alive»,*** wrote a witness. Bishop Ximenes Belo referred to this and other similar cases in a letter to



Monsignor Costa Lopes: ***«The 'bapak' (Indonesian term of esteem, used disparagingly by the Timorese) laughs gleefully, rubbing his hands together, and says that he is not to blame»*** *(letter, 16 February 1984).*

In August 1988, an AFP journalist visiting East Timor announced that the local Church was negotiating the surrender of the guerrillas. The report stemmed from a meeting which Father Locatelli, Aleixo Ximenes, Chairman of the Baucau regional Assembly, and Joaquim Guterres, Commander of the company of Hansips (Timorese troops working with the Indonesian army) in Ossu, had with Xanana Gusmão in person. The purpose of the meeting is not clear, but the Indonesian army was aware of it. On the day it was to take place, Indonesian soldiers insisted on being present on the pretence of ensuring the safety of the participants. Then they tried, unsuccessfully, to capture Xanana Gusmão. After their failed attempt, the Indonesians arrested and tortured Joaquim Guterres. Aleixo Ximenes sought refuge in the Bishop's residence, while Father Locatelli was interrogated in the Kopskam in Dili (military intelligence headquarters). Is this they way to repay a service, even if it failed? Isn't it more likely that the Indonesians were taking advantage of the two Timorese and the missionary against their wills?

There are innumerable examples of such cases...
At the time of Xanana Gusmão's capture, some senior Timorese civil servants and military auxiliaries were arrested and accused of having had links with him. While 'collaboration' with the enemy is necessary, in certain circumstances for the sake of survival, infiltration of the enemy's administrative branches is one of the strategies used in the collective resistance effort.

«The procession that took place in Dili on 12 November 1991 was a peaceful demonstration of political dissent by unarmed civilians; (...) The forces that perpetrated the killings were regular members of the Indonesian armed forces; (...) the action of the Indonesian security forces was not a spontaneous reaction ... but rather a planned military operation designed to deal with a public expression of political dissent in a way not in accordance with international human rights standards. (...)
The Special Rapporteur was told by the Indonesian authorities that 19 persons had been killed (at Santa Cruz cemetery) (...) According to testimonies gathered in East Timor by the Special Rapporteur, the total number of persons killed was estimated to be between 150 and 270. (...)»

(The Report, published December 1994, of Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions)

1995

TALKS BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND INDONESIA
INTRA-TIMORESE DIALOGUE

«The General Assembly (...) Requests the Secretary General to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem...»

(Resolution 3730, UN General Assembly, 1982)

«The Church appeals to the political leaders to take into account the legitimate and fundamental aspirations of the Timorese people»

(Monsignor Belo, Schlaining Intra-Timorese meeting, 1995)

In June 1995 in Austria, on the invitation of the UN Secretary General, Timorese of all political tendencies, some living in East Timor and others in exile, met together for the first time. The 'Intra-Timorese dialogue', which was also sponsored by the UN like the Portugal-Indonesia talks, was an effort to comply with resolution 37/30, the last General Assembly resolution on the question, adopted in 1982.

Supported by Portugal and resisted by Indonesia, the resolution was adopted by only 50 votes in favour, with 46 against, and 50 abstentions. The US cast its vote against the resolution, while all the major countries of the European Community abstained. This clearly indicates the very relative importance given by the international community to Timor or, perhaps more accurately, the considerable importance many governments attached to their relations with Indonesia. In an attempt to overcome this lack of interest, resolution 37/30 mandated the Secretary General (SG) to continue to keep the situation under consideration, within the framework of the UN Charter and the resolutions already adopted on the matter.

In this setting of limited support from the international community, the UN SG initiated diplomatic meetings between Portugal and Indonesia. Indonesia could not refuse to take part, but did everything possible to draw out the discussion on secondary issues, thereby avoiding the essential questions.

International pressure intensified in the aftermath of the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991. The SG re-launched the diplomatic talks at a quicker pace (twice a year) but in view of the fact that the positions of Portugal and Indonesia were still poles apart, the SG recommended the adoption of «confidence-building measures» by both sides.

One such measure, introduced by Indonesia, were the «reconciliation meetings» between Timorese living in the territory and Timorese in exile. The meetings, which in principle were open to all Timorese, were flawed by the fact that not only had the material wherewithal stemmed entirely from Indonesia, but also the meetings' mandate — apparent from their very name. The Timorese who took part in the meetings were as good as stating, whether intentionally or otherwise, that the problem of East Timor was one of lack of understanding among the Timorese themselves, and that the solution was to be found in reconciliation with one another. Furthermore, while any conclusions or recommendations arising from the meetings were in no way binding on Jakarta (as was clear from President Suharto's refusal to respond even to a few suggestions made in the second meeting), Indonesia's interests would be served if they were acceptable as that would lend credibility to its initiative.

The UN took up the idea and proposed ***«Intra-Timorese meetings»*** under its own auspices. Not only the name of the meetings had changed, but their significance too. It was no accident that, when the SG put forward his proposal, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, insisted that the question of Timor's self-determination be kept out of the discussions, while his Portuguese counterpart, Durão Barroso, demanded that the debate be free of restrictions. They were so divided on this question that the SG's invitation had to state both of these demands side by side.

The 30 Timorese invited by the UN did not clearly divide ideologically according to their origin (from within Timor or in exile). For example, the representatives chosen from within Timor, with the exception of the Bishop of Dili, were Timorese who were, or had been in senior positions in the Indonesian administration, but this did not necessarily mean that they were all pro-Indonesia. Guilherme Gonçalves, for example, was the first Governor appointed by Indonesia, but at the meeting he spoke out in favour of independence.

Similarly, among the exiles there were some who, because it was in their own interests, were in favour of solutions that would suit Indonesia. Indonesia and some of the participants in the 'reconciliation meetings' found it hard to agree to the UN's proposal. Abílio Araújo (expelled from Fretilin) for example, criticised the fact the UN had taken over the initiative of the meetings, and claimed that the UN's role should be limited to merely facilitating broader participation in the 'reconciliation' meetings. Lopes da Cruz, an adviser to Suharto, wanted any proposals arising from the discussions to be presented to the Indonesian President alone, and not to the UN or the Portuguese Government.

The only participant applauded by both sides was Monsignor Belo when, rising above the parties, he put forward the Church's view:

«With regards the future of East Timor (that is, integration or independence) the position of the Church of East Timor is to accept whatever the Timorese themselves choose. (...)

As long as the Timorese are treated like a defeated people and are turned into hostages in their own country, this will be a major obstacle in the path of its genuine, fair and comprehensive development. (...)

Authority based exclusively on threat, terror, intimidation and corruption, will prevent fulfilment of the common good. The Timorese feel that they are annexed (vanquished) and not integrated».

At the end of the meeting, the participants agreed on a document emphasising the importance of the talks between the Indonesian and Portuguese governments under the auspices of the UN SG, which aim to seek a ***«just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable settlement within the framework of Resolution 37/30».*** Days later, the participants from within Timor were forced to back-track, and signed a statement disclaiming the reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 37/30: Indonesia had rejected this reference because, in its preamble, Resolution 37/30 recognises the right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence! (see page 49).

The ACP-EU (64 countries from Africa, the Caribbean, Pacific, and the EU)
- **Recalling its previous resolutions on East Timor,**
- **Calls on the Indonesian authorities to order the immediate release of the members of the Timor opposition, including Mr. Gusmão,**
- **Considers that negotiations under the aegis of the Secretary General of the United Nations must continue, with the intention of associating the representatives of the people of Timor, but believes that there should be no limitation on the subjects on which they can express an opinion, particularly the status of East Timor.**

(Resolution, Joint Assembly meeting in Dakar, 3 Feb. 1995)

INDONESIANS WEARY OF EAST TIMOR

«We are detecting the spread of a kind of "East Timor fatigue" among many Indonesians»

(Jakarta Post editorial, 28 Sept. 95)

While some people outside Indonesia believe that East Timor will only be independent when Indonesia has a democratic regime, in Indonesia itself there are those who think that Indonesia will only be democratic when East Timor is free.

Lack of respect for the laws and decisions which they themselves had elaborated, led many States to regard East Timor as a mere appendage of Indonesia. A close reading of the way Indonesians themselves are starting to think today might prompt them change that view.

Before the Santa Cruz massacre, East Timor was a taboo subject in Indonesia, and very few Indonesians knew what was going on there. Although the report published in 1990 by a research team from the Gadjah Mada University broached the subject and was, therefore, a sign that some headway was being made, the study only reached university circles.

Jakarta's denials of the news spread by the international media about the Santa Cruz massacre, offered Indonesian reporters an excellent opportunity to publish the news itself, along with the official denials. The condemnation of their country by international public opinion (the effects of which are still felt whenever Indonesian leaders visit foreign countries and are confronted with signs of disapproval) forced many Indonesians to think.

Whether because they have been shocked by the massacre itself, or concerned about its international repercussions, Indonesians can no longer ignore East Timor:
«We truly regret that, on account of a group in the Armed Forces, the Nation's moral integrity, dignity and credibility have been undermined in the eyes of the world and those of our own people» *(Catholic Bishops' Conference, Tempo, 7 Dec. 1991).*

In November 1994, Indonesia hosted the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit, which brought Heads of State and Government, including US President Clinton, to Jakarta. Given that the summit was of major importance for Indonesia's international image, General Hendro-Priyono, the Indonesian capital's Military Commander, warned:

«Let no one try to cause any disturbance during the APEC summit. We have 5,000 security agents ready to safeguard the meeting. No one had better try to use the occasion to discredit the Indonesian nation in the eyes of the world by organising demonstrations, distributing pamphlets or posters or holding strikes. We will treat all those who cause disturbances during the APEC meeting not just as criminals, but as traitors» *(Kompas, 26 Oct. 1994).*

The Timorese did not pass up the opportunity. Twenty-nine of them managed to scale the railings surrounding the US Embassy compound in Jakarta and remained inside, attracting the attention of journalists from all over the world, who had gathered in Dili to cover the summit meeting.

For the domestic opposition to Indonesia's military regime, the Timorese have become models of courage, and the question of Timor has turned into a weapon to use against the dictatorship. For other Indonesians, East Timor is a heavy burden or, at very least, ***«a stone in Indonesia's shoe»,*** as Foreign Minister Ali Alatas once described it.

Following the September 1995 confrontations between Timorese and Indonesians in several cities in Timor, Moslem leader Amien Rais nicknamed the Timorese the ***«spoiled brats»***. During a debate at the Gadjah Mada University, he threatened the Timorese with what they would probably most like to see happen:
«We ought to change our attitude and teach those children a lesson (...) instead of wasting our energy and money, I agree with Muladi (Professor at Gadjah Mada) that we should leave them to their own devices and let them become a small State».

This was not the approach of Professor Aditjondro, of the University of Salatiga, who asked: ***«what would be more effective for them (the Timorese): to use all the oil from the Timor-Gap on development in East Timor or, as part of Indonesia, to have to ask for a share in the***

RISIONE
LIDER
POVO

profits flowing into the centre (Jakarta)?» *(Sinar, 19 Nov. 1994).*

The weariness revealed by Amien Rais can also be detected in one of Indonesia's major newspapers, The *Jakarta Post.* In an editorial published on 11 September 1995, entitled **«Time to Reflect»**, the journal points out: ***«...a more important question (than denying the political nature of the disturbances in East Timor) is to consider why confrontations in East Timor are still occurring with disturbing regularity, considering the fact that the Government continues to assure us that everything is fine in East Timor (...) All this makes it clear that is high time we seriously examined our consciences with regard to East Timor»*** *(Jakarta Post, 11 Sept. 1995).*

Days later, The Jakarta Post dedicated another editorial to East Timor :
«...we are detecting the spread of a kind of «East Timor fatigue» among many Indonesians. Questions such as, how much longer will the East Timor problem continue to haunt us, or, why does East Timor continue to be a running sore even after almost 20 years of integration, are examples of this feeling.» *(Jakarta Post, 28 Sept. 1995).*

Why should the government not initiate a conference, a series of conferences if necessary, in which all parties, including intellectuals, religious leaders, Armed Forces officers, government officials, parliamentarians, informal leaders, plus scores of other noted individuals, can have open and frank discussions on how to resolve the East Timor dilemma?

(Jakarta Post, editorial, 28 Sept. 1995)

UN

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

RESOLUTION 384 (1975) of 22 December 1975

The Security Council,

- Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Portugal (S/11899),
- Having heard the statements of the representatives of Portugal and Indonesia,
- Having heard representatives of the people of East Timor,
- Recognising the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,
- Noting that General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX) of 12 December 1975, inter alia, requested the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to send a fact-finding mission to East Timor,
- Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in East Timor,
- Gravely concerned also at the loss of life and conscious of the urgent need to avoid further bloodshed in East Timor,
- Deploring the intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in East Timor,
- Regretting that the Government of Portugal did not discharge fully its responsibilities as administering Power in the Territory under Chapter XI of the Charter,

1. Calls upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),
2. Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay all its forces from the Territory,
3. Calls upon the Government of Portugal as administering Power to co-operate fully with the United Nations so as to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination,
4. Urges all States and other parties concerned to co-operate fully with the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a peaceful solution to the existing situation and to facilitate the decolonisation of the Territory,
5. Requests the Secretary-General to send urgently a special representative to East Timor for the purpose of making an on-the-spot assessment of the existing situation and of establishing contact with all the parties in the Territory and all States concerned in order to ensure the implementation of the present resolution,
6. Further requests the Secretary General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and, taking into account the report of his special representative, to submit recommendations to the Security Council as soon as possible,
7. Decides to remain seized of the situation.

UN

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

Resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982

The General Assembly,

- Recognising the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and other relevant United Nations resolutions,
- Having examined the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to East Timor and other relevant documents,
- Taking note of the report of the Secretary General on the question of East Timor,
- Taking note of resolution 1982/20 adopted by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on 8 September 1982,
- Having heard the statement of the representative of Portugal, as the administering Power,
- Having heard the statement of the representative of Indonesia,
- Having heard the statements of the representative of the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente and of various East Timor petitioners, as well as of the representatives of non-governmental organisations,
- Bearing in mind that Portugal, the administering Power, has stated its full and solemn commitment to uphold the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence,
- Bearing in mind also its resolutions 3485 (XXX) of 12 December 1975, 31/53 of 1 December 1976, 32/34 of 28 November 1977, 33/39 of 13 December 1978, 34/40 of 21 November 1979, 35/27 of 11 November 1980 and 36/50 of 24 November 1981,
- Concerned with the humanitarian situation prevailing in the Territory and believing that all efforts should be made by the international community to improve the living conditions of the people of East Timor and to guarantee to these people the effective enjoyment of their fundamental human rights,

1. Requests the Secretary General to initiate consultations with all parties directly concerned, with a view to exploring avenues for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;
2. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to keep the situation in the Territory under active consideration and to render all assistance to the Secretary General with a view to facilitating the implementation of the present resolution;
3. Calls upon all specialised agencies and other organisations of the United Nations system, in particular the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, immediately to assist, within their respective fields of competence, the people of East Timor, in close consultation with Portugal, as the administering Power.
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled 'Question of East Timor'.



INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHIRKS ITS RESPONSABILITY – FOR HOW MUCH LONGER?

Not only have there been 20 years of occupation, and 20 years of resistance, but also 20 years during which the international community has shirked its responsibility.

This shirking has taken all shapes and forms — from indifference to complicity.

Governments and international bodies are guilty of complicity — they did little or nothing to stop the genocide. They cannot claim that they were unaware it was happening: every year from 1975 to 1982, there were reminders — either the UN Security Council or General Assembly adopted resolutions denouncing the gravity of the situation. From 1982 onwards, numerous resolutions and positions have been adopted in a wide variety of forums, but the political will to force Indonesia to change its conduct has always been lacking.

In recent years, international awareness that the problem of East Timor will not be resolved by Indonesia's domination has considerably increased, but not yet to the extent that it has altered the practices engaged in by most governments.

It is governments which are, in direct proportion to their influence on the Indonesian government and/or on international governmental organisations, mainly responsible for the continuance of the occupation, and the abuses committed under it. In addition to governments, many individuals and organisations that are in positions in which they could influence governments (by informing, protesting, pressuring) but do not do so, also have a share in that responsibility.

The occupation persists ...
Resistance continues ...
And what about international shirking?
The answer lies partly in the hands of each one of us!


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LAOS
THAILAND
Bangkok
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
Songkhla
South China Sea
Pacific Ocean
PHILIPPINES
Sulu Sea
Kudat
Banda Aceh
ACEH
MALAYSIA
BRUNEI
SABAH
Medan
Kuala Lumpur
Sibu
SARAWAK
SULAWESI
Manado
Halmahera
Pacific Ocean
SINGAPORE
Padang
Pontianak
KALIMANTAN
Balikpapan
Sorong
Palembang
Banjarmasin
MOLUCCAS
Jayapura
Kavieng
Indian Ocean
SUMATRA
Java Sea
IRIAN JAYA
Wewak
Jakarta
Ujung Pandang
INDONESIA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Semarang
JAVA
Surabaya
SUMBAWA
FLORES
Dili
BALI
SUMBA
Kupang
EAST TIMOR
Merauke
Daru
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Timor Sea
Darwin
INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR
Indian Ocean
AUSTRALIA
ATAURO ISLAND
Lospalos
Liquisa
Manatuto
Dili
Ermera
Aileu
Baucau
Viqueque
Maliana
Ainaro
Same
OECUSSE
EAST TIMOR
Suai
WEST TIMOR
Timor Sea

PEACE IS POSSIBLE IN EAST TIMOR